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Governmental Conservation Easements
A MEANS TO ADVANCE EFFICIENCY, FREEDOM
FROM COERCION, FLEXIBILITY, AND DEMOCRACY∗
Gerald Korngold†
INTRODUCTION
Over the past twenty-five years, conservation easements
have become widely recognized and utilized as a major vehicle for
preserving natural and ecologically sensitive land. Much of the
discussion and acquisition efforts during this time have focused
on conservation easements held by nonprofit organizations
(NPOs).1 Conservation easements held by NPOs have been
lauded for being perpetual, private rather than governmental,
efficient, consensual and representing the free choice of the
parties, and serving the public interest in conservation.2
During this same period, courts have increasingly
recognized and protected property rights in the face of a variety
of governmental actions, prompting renewed calls for diminished
governmental control over land.3 These voices have condemned
governmental coercion of owners and extolled the benefits of
consensual, market-based arrangements. In light of these
developments, the public’s ability to control land use and
∗
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1
Conservation easements held by NPOs are also referred to as “private”
conservation easements. This paper sometimes uses the term “easements” for
“conservation easements” for simplicity. For data on the growth of NPO easements, see
LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, 2010 NATIONAL CENSUS REPORT: A LOOK AT VOLUNTARY LAND
CONSERVATION IN AMERICA, available at https://www.landtrustalliance.org/land-trusts/
land-trust-census/national-land-trust-census-2010/2010-final-report.
2
See infra note 8.
3
See Ilya Somin, Taking Property Rights Seriously? The Supreme Court and
the “Poor Relation” of Constitutional Law 1 (George Mason Law & Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 08-53, 2009), available at http://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/
files/publications/working_papers/08-53%20Taking%20Property%20Rights.pdf (“[T]he
Supreme Court has expanded protection for constitutional property rights. After
decades of neglect, the Court has begun to take constitutional property rights
seriously.” (citation omitted)); see also infra Parts II.B, III.A.1, and III.A.2.
†
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activities through uncompensated regulation has been curtailed
and critiqued.
This paper argues that these two independent
developments—the rise of private conservation easements and
the critique of excessive public land use regulation—militate for
the increased use of consensual conservation easements by
governmental entities to achieve public land preservation goals.
Governmental conservation easements can realize the benefits
of efficiency, consent and free choice, and conservation, while
also avoiding the coercion implicit in public land use regulation.
Moreover, governmental conservation easements have
advantages over private easements in some situations: they may
be more easily modified or terminated to address future changes
in conservation values and community needs; they are
transparent and subject to democratic, participatory processes;
and they may be better positioned to discern and represent the
public interest when making acquisition, modification, and
termination decisions about conservation easements.
I make two clarifications up front. First, I do not argue
that NPO-held conservation easements should be eschewed.
Indeed, private conservation easements provide tremendous
benefits, and they should continue to be utilized and lauded as a
land preservation vehicle. My main contribution lies in
demonstrating that governmental conservation easements
should also be increased, and that there may be some lessons
from governmental conservation easements that can be
beneficially applied to NPO-based easements. Second, I believe
that public land use regulation is important and that the
government should continue to use it. I simply suggest, however,
that, in some circumstances, the increased use of consensual
land use arrangements can advance land preservation goals
while avoiding some of the negatives of public regulation.
Part I will examine the general background on
conservation easements as well as the particular attributes and
data related to governmental easements. Part II will develop the
policy benefits and drawbacks of governmental conservation
easements, and it will compare governmental easements to
NPO-held easements and public land use controls. With respect
to governmental easements, it will examine the issues of
efficiency and cost, the dichotomy between freedom and
coercion, the importance of flexibility, and the value of
participatory democracy. Part III will examine some special
concerns of governmental easements and suggest ways to
address them, including nonconsensual acquisition through
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eminent domain and exactions; procedural impediments to
flexibility and democratic governance; and statutory controls
on modification and termination.
I.

THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT ARCHITECTURE

A.

Features

A conservation easement is a negative restriction on a
parcel of land that prevents the owner and successors from
altering the property’s ecological, natural, open, or scenic
features.4 Typical conservation easement documents require a
general undertaking not to interfere with these natural
4

UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENTS ACT § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 170 (1981). William
H. Whyte, Jr. popularized if not coined the phrase, and was an early proponent. See
generally William H. Whyte, Jr., Securing Open Space for Urban America:
Conservation Easements, URB. LAND INST.: TECHNICAL BULL., No. 36, Dec. 1959.
Russell Brenneman was an early, influential legal writer and supporter of conservation
easements. See generally RUSSELL L. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO THE
PRESERVATION OF OPEN LAND (1967). For prior work on the conservation easements,
see generally Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis
in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433 (1984)
[hereinafter Korngold, Conservation Servitudes]; Gerald Korngold, Resolving the
Intergenerational Conflicts of Real Property Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal
Autonomy for Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1525, 1525-27 (2007); Gerald
Korngold, Solving the Contentious Issues of Private Conservation Easements: Promoting
Flexibility for the Future and Engaging the Public Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
1039 [hereinafter Korngold, Contentious Issues]; Gerald Korngold, Globalizing
Conservation Easements: Private Law Approaches for International Environmental
Protection, 28 WISC. INT’L L.J. 585 (2011) [hereinafter Korngold, Globalizing Easements].
Other articles on conservation easements include James Boyd, Kathryn
Caballero & David R. Simpson, The Law and Economics of Habitat Conservation:
Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 209 (2000);
Zachary Bray, Reconciling Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and
Dilemma of Conservation Easements, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 119 (2010); Federico
Cheever, Public Good and Private Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation
Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077 (1996);
Jessica E. Jay, When Perpetual Is Not Forever: The Challenge of Changing Conditions,
Amendment, and Termination of Perpetual Conservation Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (2012); Jessica O. Lippman, The Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements,
84 NEB. L. REV. 1043 (2006); Julia D. Mahoney, Land Preservation and Institutional
Design, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 433 (2008); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Rethinking the
Perpetual Nature of Conservation Easements, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 421 (2005)
[hereinafter McLaughlin, Rethinking]; Nancy A. McLaughlin, Condemning Conservation
Easements: Protecting the Public Interest and Investment in Conservation, 41 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1897 (2008); Peter M. Morisette, Conservation Easements and the Public Good:
Preserving the Environment on Private Lands, 41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 373 (2001); James
L. Olmstead, Representing Nonconcurrent Generations: The Problem of Now, 23 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 451 (2008); Christopher Serkin, Entrenching Environmentalism: Private
Conservation Easements over Public Land, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 341 (2010); Melissa K.
Thompson & Jessica E. Jay, An Examination of Court Opinions on the Enforcement and
Defense of Conservation Easements and Other Conservation and Preservation Tools:
Themes and Approaches to Date, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 373 (2001).
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features, as well as specific, related prohibitions that may, for
example, ban or otherwise limit subdividing the property,
erecting additional buildings and structures, harvesting timber,
and paving roads.5 With the exception of easements creating
recreational rights, easements generally do not grant public
access.6 Accordingly, conservation easements protecting natural
habitats or views do not grant public access to the property.7
Conservation easements are valued for safeguarding
pleasing views, preserving biodiversity, remediating atmospheric
conditions, protecting watersheds, and promoting psychic
benefits.8 Proponents claim various economic advantages as well,
ranging from preserving ecological capital for future generations
and conserving farmland for food sources to enhancing quality of
life in order to attract skilled labor.9 Individual property values
may also benefit from nearby land restricted by conservation
easements.10 Yet despite these positive features, the conservation
easement phenomenon is more than the sum of its beneficial
components: it is part of a new American outlook toward our land.
Indeed, in recent years, many have come to view the conservation
of our natural and historic heritage as a vital value to be balanced
against the traditional model favoring full development.11
In light of questions concerning the validity of
conservation easements, various state legislatures have passed

5

Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 4, at 1045-46.
Id. at 1046. The easement holder usually has a limited right of access to
inspect and monitor the easement area. See id. at 1046 n.17.
7
Id. at 1045.
8
See VIRGINIA MCCONNELL & MARGARET WALLS, THE VALUE OF OPEN
SPACE: EVIDENCE FROM STUDIES OF NONMARKET BENEFITS (2005), available at
http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-report-open%20spaces.pdf; cf. LILLY SHOUP & REID
EWING, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF OPEN SPACE, RECREATION FACILITIES AND
WALKABLE COMMUNITY DESIGN (2010), available at http://www.activelivingresearch.org/
files/Synthesis_Shoup-Ewing_March2010_0.pdf (Open spaces generate economic
benefits to local governments, homeowners, and businesses because of higher property
values and tax valuations.).
9
See ECON. LEAGUE OF GREATER PHILA. ET AL., THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF
PROTECTED OPEN SPACE IN SOUTHEASTERN PENNSYLVANIA (Jan. 2011), available at
http://economyleague.org/files/Protected_Open_Space_SEPA_2-11.pdf; RAND WENTWORTH,
LAND TRUST ALLIANCE FACT SHEET: ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF OPEN SPACE PROTECTION
(Spring 2003), available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conservation/documents/
economic-benefits.pdf; John L. Crompton, The Impact of Parks on Property Values: A
Review of the Empirical Evidence, 33 J. OF LEISURE RES. 1, 5 (2001).
10
See Jacqueline Geoghegan, The Value of Open Spaces in Residential Land
Use, 19 LAND USE POL’Y 91 (2002).
11
See Cary Coglianese, Social Movements, Law and Society: The
Institutionalization of the Environmental Movement, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 85, 91-94
(2001); D.T. Kuzmiak, The American Environmental Movement, 157 GEOGRAPHICAL J.
265, 265-67 (1991).
6
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statutes authorizing these interests.12 While some jurisdictional
variation exists, conservation easements generally share similar
attributes: only a qualified nonprofit organization or government
may hold them;13 they are typically held in gross, meaning that
the easement holder does not own adjacent land that the
restriction benefits;14 they are usually perpetual15 and require
unlimited duration for deductibility of easement donations;16
they are enforceable in rem, as property interests;17 and they
are binding on successive owners of the burdened property.18
B.

The Tax Subsidy

While the government’s purchase of a conservation
easement involves a direct payout of public funds, the donation
of a conservation easement results in a tax expenditure and thus
taps into the United States public purse as well. Under Section
170(h) of the Internal Revenue Code, a donation of a
conservation easement to a nonprofit organization or to the
United States, the states, or a political subdivision is deductible.19
Moreover, for federal estate tax purposes, property values are
reduced by the value of a conservation easement, which
generates further potential revenue losses for the Treasury.20
Conservation easement donations also reduce state and
local tax revenues. Some states allow income-tax deductions or
credits for the donations.21 Moreover, because easement
restrictions reduce the assessed value of the land, the presence
of conservation easements diminishes property tax revenues.22
12

See Korngold, Globalizing Easements, supra note 4, at 594-97.
UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(2), 12 U.L.A. 70 (1981).
14
Id. § 4(1).
15
Id. § 2(c) (“[A] conservation easement is unlimited in duration unless the
instrument creating it otherwise provides.”).
16
I.R.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2006).
17
UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 1(1).
18
Id., Comm’rs’ Prefatory Note.
19
26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (2006).
20
Property Subject to Restrictive Arrangements, 26 C.F.R. § 25.2703-1(a)(4) (1992).
21
See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 210(38) (McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 105-151.12 (West 2012). This is usually reflected not by a specific state tax code
provision but by the state tracking the federal income tax structure and its deductions.
See Jeffrey O. Sundberg & Richard F. Dye, Tax Property Value Effects of Conservation
Easements 7 & nn.15-16 (Lincoln Inst. of Land Policy, Working Paper No. WP06JS1),
available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/PubDetail.aspx?pubid=1128.
22
See Jet Black, LLC v. Routt Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 165 P.3d 744, 74950 (Colo. App. 2006) (referring to special statutory treatment of conservation easement
land under agricultural use); Firethorn Investment v. Lancaster Cnty. Bd. of
Equalization, 622 N.W.2d 605, 610-11 (Neb. 2001) (when land’s highest and best use
was as a golf course, presence of conservation easements did not reduce its value); Ross
13
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Lower property tax revenues leave the municipality with the
prospect of decreasing services or increasing taxes on other
citizens to close the gap. Accordingly, conservation easements
both purchased by government and donated to nonprofits
result in public expenditures, which may be direct or indirect
costs borne by federal, state, or local governments.
C.

Governmental Conservation Easements

A variety of governmental entities currently hold
conservation easements of differing types. This subsection
describes the history, forms, and emerging data on governmental
conservation easements.
1. Background
Federal,23 state,24 and local25 governments currently own
conservation easements.26 Governmental conservation easements
v. Town of Santa Clara, 698 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91-93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (since land was
already restricted against development, conservation easement did not decrease value);
Gibson v. Gleason, 798 N.Y.S.2d 541 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (upholding trial court’s
order to reduce property tax assessment because of conservation easement barring
subdivision and limiting lot to agricultural uses); McKee v. Dep’t of Rev., No. TC 4620,
2004 WL 2340265, at *3 (Or. T.C. Oct. 14, 2004) (finding significant effect of
conservation easement on value when compared to other properties); Luca v. Lincoln
Cnty. Assessor, No. TC-MD 010953F, 2003 WL 21252488, at *6 (Or. T.C. Mar. 19,
2003) (court acknowledges drop in development potential); Daniel S. Stockford,
Comment, Property Tax Assessment of Conservation Easements, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 823 (1990) (addressing the reduced assessments resulting from the placement of a
conservation easement). For an excellent discussion of the various jurisdictional
treatments of conservation easements for state tax purposes, see Joan M. Youngman,
Taxing and Untaxing Land: Open Space and Conservation Easements, 41 STATE TAX
NOTES 747, 747-62 (2006).
23
See, e.g., Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve Program, 16 U.S.C.
§ 3830 (2006); United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906, 908-10 (8th Cir. 1974)
(enforcing easement barring draining of wetlands enforced against successor to
grantor); Lost Tree Vill. Corp. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 711, 716 (2010) (referring to
conservation easements held by Corps of Army Engineers).
24
See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 46 A.3d 473,
478, 486 (Md. 2012); Bennett v. Comm’r of Food & Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365 (Mass.
1991) (agricultural preservation easement); see also Friends of Shawangunks, Inc. v.
Knowlton, 476 N.E.2d 988, 989 (N.Y. 1985) (conservation easements purchased by the
Palisades Interstate Park Commission, located in New York and New Jersey).
25
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. City of Hayward, 623 P.2d 180 (Cal. 1981)
(agricultural use easement held by city); Ephrata Area Sch. Dist. v. Cnty. of Lancaster,
938 A.2d 264, 266, 268 (Pa. 2007) (county owned open space easement); Ashleigh G.
Morris, Note, Conservation Easements and Urban Parks: From Private to Public Use,
51 NAT. RESOURCES J. 357 (2011) (suggesting use of municipal conservation easements
to protect urban park lands); Amy Matzke-Fawcett, Franklin County Gets Funding
From
State
to
Save
Farmland,
ROANOKE TIMES
(Jan.
20,
2012),
http://www.roanoke.com/news/roanoke/wb/303743 (state providing $50,000 matching
funds to county to acquire agricultural conservation easement).
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date back to at least the 1930s. Early federal programs include
the National Park Service’s acquisition of scenic easements
along the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace Parkway in the 1930s
and 1940s;27 the legislation authorizing the acquisition of
wetland easements and their designation as Waterfowl
Production Areas in 1958;28 and the Highway Beautification Act
of 1965, which provided funding to the states for the
acquisition of scenic easements along highways.29 The state of
Wisconsin launched “the first major state-supported program
to purchase conservation easements in the United States” in
the early 1950s, when it began to acquire scenic easements
along highways adjacent to the Mississippi River.30
Governments may acquire easements by different
methods and for different purposes. For example, governmental
easements may be acquired in exchange for consideration31 or
26

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES §§ 2.18, 8.5 (2000)
(discussing acquisition and enforcement of conservation easements by governmental
bodies). Government also might acquire a conservation easement and subsequently
transfer it to a nonprofit, see, e.g., Mesa Cnty. Land Conservancy v. Allen, No.
11CA1416, 2012 Colo. App. LEXIS 922 (June 7, 2012) (enforcing easement granted by
United States through the Farmers Home Administration to a nonprofit), or provide
funds to a nonprofit to acquire an easement, see, e.g., Rusty Dennen, Caroline Farmer
Protects Land, Fort, FREDERICKSBURG.COM (Dec. 3, 2011), http://fredericksburg.com/
News/FLS/2011/122011/12032011/668261; Rusty Dennen, Easement Problem Leads to
Lawsuit, FREDERICKSBURG.COM (May 22, 2012), http://fredericksburg.com/News/
FLS/2012/052012/05222012/702032/; Christopher Dunagan, Forest and Streams
Protected in Union River Area, KITSAP SUN (Bremerton, WA) (Jan. 4, 2012, 6:16 PM),
http://www.forterra.org/news/forest_and_streams_protected_in_union_river_area (state
provided $480,000 to NPO to acquire easement on forestland). The federal government
has also contributed funds under the Army Compatible Use Buffer program for the
acquisition of easements by state and local government and NPOs surrounding army
bases that preserves the land and also provides buffer for training purposes. See 10
U.S.C. § 2684a (2006).
27
Federico Cheever & Nancy A. McLaughlin, Why Environmental Lawyers
Should Know (And Care) About Land Trusts and Their Private Land Conservation
Transactions, 34 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10,223, 10,223-24 (2004).
28
United States v. Johansen, 93 F.3d 459, 461 (8th Cir. 1996).
29
See generally Roger A. Cunningham, Scenic Easements in the Highway
Beautification Program, 45 DENV. L.J. 168 (1968) (describing federal Highway
Beautification Act of 1965 allocating each state federal funds to acquire easements and
fees along highways).
30
Brian W. Ohm, The Purchase of Scenic Easements and Wisconsin’s Great
River Road: A Progress Report on Perpetuity, 66 J. AM. PLANNING ASS’N 177, 178 (2000).
31
See, e.g., Johansen, 93 F.3d at 461 (waterfowl easement purchased in
1960s in North Dakota on 320 acres for $600); Droste v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 159 P.3d
601, 603 (Colo. 2007) (describing purchase by County in 1999 of conservation easement
on 500 acres for $7.5 million and 1996 purchase of easement on 100 acres for $480,000);
Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 46 A.3d 473, 478 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2012) (agricultural easement on 199 acres purchased for $796,500 by Maryland
Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation, an entity of the Maryland Department of
Agriculture); Bill Reed, Bucks County Preserves 150th Farm in Its Preservation
Program, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 23, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-03-23/news/

474

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:2

by gift.32 Moreover, governments may obtain easements
proactively pursuant to a statutory framework, such as specific
legislation authorizing the acquisition of easements to preserve
agricultural lands,33 wetlands,34 or other environmentally
sensitive lands.35 Alternatively, where the easement is not part
of a larger pattern or program of easements, it may be acquired
as part of the bargaining process in granting approval of a
developer’s building plan.36
Governmental easements vary in duration. While some
governmental conservation easements are perpetual,37 others
may be for a designated time period, especially where the
government acquires them pursuant to particular programs.38
Moreover, some easements may be drafted as perpetual but
permitted to terminate if certain events occur.39

31229859_1_agricultural-land-preservation-program-farms-4-h-program (payment of
$608,260 by county for conservation easement on 135 acre farm).
32
See, e.g., Carol Kugler, State Receives 1,500-acre Land Donation,
BLOOMINGTON, IND. HERALD-TIMES, May 13, 2012, at C7, available at
http://www.heraldtimesonline.com/stories/2012/05/11/earth.703801.sto.
33
See, e.g., Environmental Conservation Acreage Reserve Program, 16 U.S.C.
§ 3830 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., AGRIC. § 2-501 (West 2012); Twomey v. Comm’r of Food
& Agric., 759 N.E.2d 691, 694 n.5 (Mass. 2001).
34
See, e.g., United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906, 911 (8th Cir. 1974)
(waterfowl habitat easement “effectuates an important national concern”); Wetlands
Reserve Program, 7 C.F.R. § 1467.4 (2009).
35
See, e.g., 32 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 5001, 5005 (West 2012) (listing a variety of
purposes including open space, watershed protection, scenic protection, and forestry, among
others); United States v. Hoyte, No. C10-2044BHS, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30105 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 7, 2012) (easement pursuant to the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic
Area Act, 16 U.S.C.A. § 544 (West 2012)); Lee Logan, County Mulls Buying, Preserving
Land Near Starkey Wilderness Park, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Dec. 24, 2011),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/localgovernment/county-mulls-buying-preserving-landnear-starkey-wilderness-park/1207621 (describing Pasco County, Florida’s Environmental
Land Acquisition and Management Program that acquires conservation easements).
36
See infra Part III.A.2.
37
See, e.g., United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d 906 (8th Cir. 1974); Stonegate
Family Holdings, Inc. v. Revolutionary Trails, Inc., 900 N.Y.S.2d 494 (N.Y. App. Div.
2010). With most private easements held by NPOs, the tax benefit provides the
“consideration” for the transfer. Since donated easements must be perpetual in order to
receive the tax benefit, see supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text, easements
contributed to NPOs are usually of unlimited duration.
38
See, e.g., Roath v. United States, No. 10-C-0228, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
150120 (E.D. Wisc. Dec. 30, 2011) (thirty-year easement under the Wetlands Preserve
Program); Sierra Club v. City of Hayward, 171 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (tenyear, renewable agricultural easement).
39
See, e.g., Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., 46 A.3d 473, 479
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (“in perpetuity, or for so long as profitable farming is feasible”).
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2. Data
The dearth of data on the number of easements, their
total acreage and location, and other key issues has hindered
the policy assessment of conservation easements. In 2011, a
consortium of several nonprofit organizations and federal
agencies launched the National Conservation Easement
Database in an attempt to collect these data and fill the
existing gap.40 While these data provide an incomplete picture
of the current inventory of conservation easements (since
reporting is voluntary), they still represent an important
advance.41 As of the most recent update in September 2012, the
database reports that there are currently 64,640 governmental
easements, which cover 11,410,653 acres.42 To provide some
perspective, the combined size of Rhode Island, Delaware,
Connecticut, and Hawaii is some nine million acres.43 Table 1
provides a breakdown of these findings:

Table 1. Number and acreage of governmental conservation easements
held by federal, state, local, and regional governmental entities44

Evidence suggests that the public has been willing to
support governmental acquisition of conservation easements.45
For example, 77 percent of 1630 ballot measures to provide
funds for land conservation between 1994 and 2005 were
approved, providing $31.1 billion in funding.46 According to
some reports, however, the 2008 financial crisis has had a
40

Nat’l Conservation Easement Database, CONSERVATIONREGISTRY.ORG,
http://conservationeasement.us/about (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).
41
There is also only limited data on conservation easements held by NPOs.
See Korngold, Globalizing Easements, supra note 4, at 597.
42
Nat’l Conservation Easement Database, supra note 40.
43
Youngman, supra note 22, at 747 n.1.
44
Data from the National Conservation Easement Database, supra note 40.
45
See, e.g., Seong-Hoon Cho et al., Measuring Rural Homeowners’ Willingness
to Pay for Land Conservation Easements, 7 FOREST POL’Y & ECON. 757, 768 (2005).
46
Andrew J. Plantinga, The Economics of Conservation Easements, in LAND
POLICIES AND THEIR OUTCOMES 90, 91-92 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2007).
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negative impact on public funding of open space.47
Nevertheless, governmental conservation easements are a
growing phenomenon. Increased data collection of existing
easements will assist policy makers in framing conservation
easement decisions going forward.
II.

OPPORTUNITIES PRESENTED BY GOVERNMENTAL
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

Governmental acquisition and administration of
conservation easements offers various benefits. This section will
assess the advantages and disadvantages of the government’s
use of conservation easements to preserve land, as compared
with zoning and other forms of public regulation, as well as
conservation easements held by NPOs. This section will focus on
four policies: efficiency, freedom versus coercion, flexibility, and
local democratic control. For the purposes of this section, we will
assume that the sale or donation of a conservation easement by
the owner to the government is consensual—that is, a freely
negotiated market transaction. Part III will examine the issues
inherent in governmental acquisition of conservation easements
by exaction and eminent domain.
A.

Efficiency and Cost
1. Benefits

Consensual conservation easement transactions—
whether engaged in by government or NPOs—can increase the
efficient allocation of our limited (and nonrenewable) land
resources. In a market exchange, the purchaser of a
conservation easement can acquire the precise interest in
property that it desires (for example, scenic protection without
physical access) and the seller can retain the degree of property
rights that it wishes (for example, the right to maintain a
single home on the property) while also monetizing the value of
any property interest it is willing to sell (that is, the easement).
If the parties were unable to negotiate conservation easements,
the party seeking to conserve the scenic view would be required
to overinvest in a fee interest, and the landowner would be
forced to liquidate more property rights than it desired—
47

See Joseph De Avila, Crunch Hits Open-Space Funds, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 6, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703748904575411690085797942.html.
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namely, the possessory right.48 In consensual sales of
conservation easements, each party can get the partial interest
in land that it seeks, which creates efficiency gains.49
Courts have implicitly recognized the importance of
enforcing freely negotiated, efficiency-maximizing transactions.
For example, one court enforced an agricultural easement
against a successor to the burdened property: “Public funds
were expended for the [easement] as a result of a bargain made
by the commissioner and the Bennetts’ predecessors in title, a
bargain of which the Bennetts had notice. There is no reason
why this reasonable restriction should not be enforced
according to its terms.”50 Another court, in denying a request to
install a swimming pool on land subject to a conservation
easement, explained:
[A] conservation restriction yields an economic benefit to the grantor
of the restriction and successor owners of the property. . . . In return
for that benefit to the owner, it is reasonable that the conservation
restriction be protected against expedient exemptions which defeat
the purpose of preserving land in its natural state.51

2. Comparison to Zoning
Governments incur a direct cost when they purchase a
conservation easement. By contrast, when governments place
the same substantive restrictions on the land through
regulation, they are freed from making an initial cash outlay to
the property owner. This would appear to provide an easy
choice for governments, especially in an era of limited budgets:
Why pay for a restriction when they could get one for free?
Although zoning comes without purchase costs, easement
acquisition may still be cost effective. First, governments may
avoid paying cash consideration when conservation easements
are donated, and the donors will receive the benefit of
charitable deductions.52 By utilizing donated easements, state

48

Additionally, if government or an NPO were forced to acquire the property
in fee, there could be a total loss of property tax collections on the property due to
exemptions. See generally DAPHNE A. KENYON & ADAM H. LANGLEY, LINCOLN INST. OF
LAND POLICY, PAYMENTS IN LIEU OF TAXES: BALANCING MUNICIPAL AND NONPROFIT
INTERESTS (2010), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/subcenters/significantfeatures-property-tax/upload/sources/ContentPages/documents/PILOTs%20PFR%20final.pdf.
49
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 9-10 (6th ed. 2003).
50
Bennett v. Comm’r of Food & Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (Mass. 1991).
51
Goldmuntz v. Town of Chilmark, 651 N.E.2d 864, 866 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
52
See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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and local governments can cover much of the acquisition cost
through federal tax expenditures.
Second, purchasing an easement on a single property
may involve significantly lower transaction costs than enacting
new zoning restrictions. If a municipality goes through the
regulatory process of “downzoning” a single property (that is,
increasing the restrictions on it) rather than legislating over a
broader area, the affected owner might be successful in
challenging the restriction.53 A broader rezoning would require
studies as well as administrative and legislative processes,
which can be expensive. Thus, the purchase of an easement on
the single property ultimately may be more cost effective. As a
related matter, speed and nimble movement may be essential
to preserve a property that is facing development. Quick
responses are imperative to a willing easement seller who is
fielding other offers. An easement purchase can be executed
more quickly and cost-effectively than a proper rezoning.
Third, as will be discussed in Part II.B.2 below, the
courts have applied regulatory takings jurisprudence to limit
the restrictions that can be imposed on development through
open-space zoning. But even if the governmental action were
vindicated by the court, litigation is expensive. If government
were to lose, it may also be required to pay significant
compensation to the owner. Thus, regulation’s short-term cost
savings ultimately may yield long-term losses.
3. NPO Holders
An NPO’s acquisition of a conservation easement has
certain advantages. Given the large demands on government
and the reality of limited resources, land conservation is better
served when private citizens step up to help improve their
communities. In particular, NPO purchases of easements do
not require direct public expenditures, which would otherwise
draw from the limited governmental resources. Also, when an
NPO purchases an easement, stewardship (that is, monitoring
and enforcing the easement) becomes the responsibility of the
private organization.54 NPOs may be more nimble than
53

See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.37 (5th ed. 2003).
Costs of enforcement have led to the creation of an insurance program for
litigation expenses. Felicity Barringer, Insurance Firm Is Set Up for Land Trusts,
Which See Legal Costs Soaring, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2012, at A14, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/20/science/earth/insurance-company-approved-forland-trusts.html.
54
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government actors, allowing them to react quickly and preserve
threatened land. Nevertheless, NPO easements raise a number
of potential concerns that governmental ownership can
mitigate or avoid.
First, in the course of acquiring conservation easements,
NPOs have virtually unlimited discretion, and they are not
required to follow a plan or set of standards.55 A nonprofit may
simply accept any easement offered, even though the land and
easement terms provide dubious environmental benefits. Many
nonprofits abide by rigorous standards in acquiring easements
and provide great value to the public.56 Nevertheless, the best
practices of industry leaders are not binding on other
nonprofits, so the possibility that the public will subsidize the
acquisition of low-value conservation easements through tax
expenditures always remains a risk.57
Second, private organizations do not acquire easements
pursuant to a public land use plan. This can lead to a
patchwork of easements that fail to yield a community-wide
open-space and preservation plan.58 As a result, conservation
easements might be sited based on the random decisions of
private donors and unaccountable NPOs, who are properly
pursuing their own interests and missions but not necessarily
the broader and inclusive land use goals that the wider public
would seek.59 This is inconsistent with current notions of
55

The Uniform Conservation Easement Act § 1(1), 12 U.L.A. 70 (1981), only
defines the values inherent in a conservation easement but does not provide a standard
for how conservation easements must be created. I.R.C. § 170(h) (2006), sets a floor on
deductibility but does not necessarily reflect an optimal easement.
56
The Nature Conservancy, for example, is a recognized leader in highquality easement practices. See About Us: Vision and Mission, NATURE
CONSERVATORY, http://www.nature.org/about-us/vision-mission/index.htm (last visited
Oct. 23, 2012).
57
See ANTHONY ANELLA & JOHN B. WRIGHT, SAVING THE RANCH:
CONSERVATION EASEMENT DESIGN IN THE AMERICAN WEST 44-45 (2004) (emphasizing
the importance of professional design standards). The Land Trust Association has been
engaged in a project to accredit land trusts that follow best practices. Accreditation,
LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/accreditation (last
visited Oct. 23, 2012). While this may provide some help on easement acquisition, this
is a non-mandatory program.
58
See Heidi J. Albers & Amy W. Ando, Could State-Level Variation in the
Number of Land Trusts Make Economic Sense?, 79 LAND ECON. 311, 312 (2003)
(“[L]ocal land trusts specializing in providing open space often do not consider the
impact of their decisions on regional conservation benefits. . . . [L]ack of coordination
among [land trusts] has become . . . a serious problem . . . .”).
59
Again, industry leaders like The Nature Conservancy, however, typically
coordinate their easement acquisitions with governmental plans and agencies. Partners
in Conservation, NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/about-us/our-partners/
index.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2012).

480

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:2

planning, which support broader regional and interstate land
use planning.60
Finally, even proponents of NPO-held conservation
easements have warned of the potential class issues with such
easements. A pattern of easements can have the effect of large-lot
zoning, by preserving landed estates and residential areas, and
by preventing subdivision and construction of more affordable
homes.61 William H. Whyte, perhaps the earliest booster of NPO
conservation easements, posed concerns of inherent “muted class
and economic conflicts,” with easement donors being the “gentry”
who have an interest in the natural countryside, not in open
space with access for parks and playgrounds.62
In contrast, governmental acquisition of conservation
easements can and should be done pursuant to a coordinated,
public land use plan or specific acquisition program. The
democratic, administrative, and legal constraints on public
action may help to ensure that the government’s public
expenditures yield high-quality easements that deliver a bigger
bang for the conservation buck. Additionally, transparency is
improved because citizens can require government to disclose
easement data, while NPOs are under no such obligation.63 The
electoral process and public discussion can help to achieve an
even distribution of government’s conservation benefits and
mitigate potential elitist actions.64
4. The Risk of Rent Seeking
Because the government’s acquisition of a conservation
easement utilizes public funds, easement purchases should
serve the needs of the community. A particular easement may
benefit neighboring owners more than other citizens, but the
overall acquisition pattern should serve the overall citizenry.
Unfortunately, there is a temptation for rent seeking, whereby
powerful individuals lobby government officials to purchase
60

See ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 26-30,
132-34 (1994).
61
There is at times a tension between proponents of conservation and affordable
housing. See, e.g., Miriam Jordan, In Tony Monterey County, Slums and a Land War,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2006), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115655289960046223.html.
62
Whyte, supra note 4, at 36-37.
63
See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 4, at 1046-47, 1070.
64
See Gregg MacDonald, Salona Task Force Will Meet, WASH. POST, June 9,
2011, at 16 (describing public process to determine appropriate uses of land under
conservation easements acquired by government, specifically whether ballfields should
be permitted or land should be retained in more natural state).
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conservation easements that will enhance the value of these
individuals’ properties.65 Both rent seekers and officials may
view the public purse as “other people’s money,” to be spent to
enhance the value of rent seekers’ property and help the
politicians curry favor. Because land costs will be distorted by
acquisitions where the buyer does not internalize the costs,
such rent-seeking purchases will not yield efficient land
allocations within the community. Moreover, there is the
obvious unfairness when some citizens subsidize the wealth
accumulation of others. NPOs are not susceptible to this
maneuver, however, because they do not have ready access to a
pool of funds and are required to both raise their funds and buy
land in a competitive market.
Even if there were no rent seeking in the easement
acquisition, neighbors whose property values are benefited by
the governmental easement may view the easement as an
entitlement.66 This will cause them to seek its enforcement and
resist any compromise. While this reaction is understandable,
these neighbors ignore the fact that the easement was
purchased to provide a public good, not a private benefit for
their properties. This phenomenon may arise with NPO-held
easements as well, where neighbors believe they hold an
interest in the burdened land.
The risk of government manipulation, both by rent
seekers and officials seeking reelection, is a concern inherent in
many governmental activities, including the acquisition of
property and services. For some, this means that the leviathan’s
activities should be limited. For others, the government’s
promotion of the public welfare through concerted action is
important and valuable, and such activity should continue with
appropriate risk-mitigation techniques—for example, procedural
guidelines, sunshine regulation, anti-corruption measures, and
other steps.
Governmental conservation easements are an efficient,
cost-effective vehicle for preserving land. While they require
up-front costs, they may prove cheaper over the long run than

65

There is a parallel problem when easements are not purchased as part of a
governmental conservation program, but rather are exacted as part of the subdivision
approval process. See infra Part III.A.2. There is a temptation that neighbors may
lobby officials for the exaction to enhance their properties and officials might easily
agree to placate voters.
66
See discussion of Zagrans v. Elek, No. 08CA009472, 2009 WL 1743203
(Ohio Ct. App. June 22, 2009), infra Part III.B.1.b.
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public land use regulation because they avoid potential
litigation expenses and awards.
B.

Coercion and Freedom
1. Policy Considerations

Governmental acquisition of a conservation easement
through a consensual market transaction represents the
property owner’s free choice to relinquish rights in the land.
Ownership entitles a land holder to exercise free choice in
order to maximize personal utility and happiness with respect
to the property, whatever others may think of that decision.67
Thus, if an owner were to grant—or not grant—a conservation
easement, the law should respect and enforce that preference.68
Even supporters of preservation may balk at “legislated
conservation easements” for impinging on their land values
and freedom.69
Unlike consensual conservation easements, public land
use regulation places restrictions on owners without their
direct consent. In recent years, there have been renewed
objections to the coercive nature of land use regulation and its
effect on the rights of property owners.70 For example, William
67

See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 17 (2d ed. 1998) (arguing that property
rights allow for democratic, participatory government as citizen-owners can criticize
officials without fearing the loss of property privileges).
68
See Loeb v. Watkins, 240 A.2d 513, 516 (Pa. 1968) (“Where a man’s land is
concerned, he may impose . . . any restrictions he pleases.”); Richard Epstein, Notice
and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1359 (1982).
Courts have recognized that freely negotiated conservation easements acquired by
government should be enforced against the owners. United States v. Albrecht, 496 F.2d
906, 910 (8th Cir. 1974) (enforcing easement barring draining of wetlands enforced
against successor to grantor; “[The Government] acquired an interest which it termed
an easement. It is clear that the parties intended it to be a permanent interest.”); Md.
Agric. Land Pres. Found. v. Claggett, 985 A.2d 565, 578 (Md. 2009) (“We do not see any
ambiguity in the instrument, and construe it according to its plain language.”).
69
See Matt Smith, An Unlikely Group Rebels Against Preservation Districts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/01/us/
an-unlikely-group-rebels-against-preservation-districts.html (one owner stating that
“when regulations make it prohibitive economically to make improvements on your
property, it’s over the top for me”).
70
See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN x (1985) (“I argue that the eminent domain clause and parallel
clauses in the Constitution render constitutionally infirm or suspect many of the
heralded reforms and institutions of the twentieth century: zoning, rent control,
workers’ compensation laws, transfer payments, progressive taxation.”); Gregory M.
Stein, Takings in the 21st Century: Reasonable Investment-Backed Expectations After
Palazzolo and Tahoe-Sierra, 69 TENN. L. REV. 891, 891 (2002) (“Between 1987 and
2000 the Supreme Court decided a large number of takings cases, and landowners won
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A. Fischel has argued that the absence of a compensation
requirement for the small number of community owners who
bear the brunt of a zoning ordinance promotes inefficiency.71 To
demonstrate this phenomenon, he provides the illustration of a
town that wants to impose open-space zoning (that is, require
minimum lot sizes of ten acres), thus barring farmers from
subdividing and cashing in, while preserving the agrarian
amenity for the rest of the population. Because the majority is
not required to compensate those who are burdened by the
regulation, it is free to ignore the plan’s effect on the town’s
total land values. In contrast, a compensation requirement
would keep government from “overconsuming” land. Moreover,
as the zoning beneficiaries, through increased property values,
because the majority owners benefit from the zoning through
increased property values, they should pay compensation in the
form of higher property taxes. Therefore, the absence of a
compensation requirement leads to rent seeking by the majority,
which is especially problematic in this example because affected
owners cannot easily exit the regulatory scheme by selling their
properties. Nevertheless, Fischel perceives a judicial reluctance
to require compensation, perhaps due to the political power of
wealthy landowners in the zoning majority or a fear of a broader
assault on all municipal regulation.
Government therefore may prefer using noncoercive
land conservation methods, such as negotiated conservation
easements. Indeed, in light of the high costs involved in
defending regulation against legal action, conservation
easements may provide a lower cost alternative. Additionally, a
prolonged battle over land use regulation can be divisive
among the citizenry and ultimately corrosive to the fabric of
the community.72

most of them. With this gradual drift toward the landowners’ position and with no
recent changes in Court membership, Court-watchers had little reason to expect the
beginning of the 21st century to produce any striking change in the direction of the
Court’s takings decisions. The Court’s first two rulings of the new century, however,
have largely disappointed property-rights advocates while heartening those who favor
the rights of government entities to regulate land.”).
71
See William A. Fischel, Public Goods and Property Rights: Of Coase,
Tiebout, and Just Compensation, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND
LAW 343-63 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003).
72
See Gerald Korngold, Cutting Municipal Services During Fiscal Crisis:
Lessons from the Denial of Services to Condominium and Homeowners Association
Owners, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 131-34 (2012).
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2. Legal Challenges
Legislation that imposes the substantive terms of a
conservation easement, including a ban on the erection of
buildings, might be challenged as a regulatory taking.73
Depending on the particular facts, a burdened owner might
show that the economic impact of the regulation is so great,
and the retained rights of the owner so few, that the legislation
crosses the line between a permissible police power regulation
and a compensable taking.74 The results in a given case would
depend on the scope and extent of the conservation regulation
and the rights the landowner retained. Rigorous legislation
banning all structures, development, timbering, agricultural
activity, and other uses75 might be viewed as destructive to all
economic use of the property and thus a per se taking under
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,76 while a height
regulation preserving scenic views would likely be upheld.77
The Supreme Court has been satisfied whenever some
economic value remains, even though there has been a
significant diminution due to the land use regulation. Thus,
“open-space zoning,” which restricts the use of land to open
space and single-family residences, did not amount to a taking
in Agins v. City of Tiburon because the ordinance permitted
owners to build one to five homes, even though they could not
build the higher-density project they had hoped for.78 Similarly,
the coastal regulation in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, which
restricted the owner of eighteen acres to a $200,000 residence on
the parcel, did not constitute a taking.79 The specific prohibitions
of “conservation-easement-type” public regulation will determine
whether there has been a taking. Permitting the fee owner to
73

See generally Douglas R. Appler, America’s Converging Open Space
Protection Policies: Evidence from New Hampshire, Virginia, and Oregon, 36 URB. LAW.
341 (2004); Janice C. Griffith, Green Infrastructure: The Imperative of Open Space
Preservation, 42/43 URB. LAW. 259 (2010/2011).
74
See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (“the
economic impact of the regulation”); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
75
Conservation easements often provide for extensive regulation of activities
and uses, although (unlike in the posited regulation) they usually permit the owner to
maintain a residence—which would likely be enough to counter a claim of a regulatory
taking. See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 4, at 1045-46.
76
Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). See Friedenburg v. N.Y.
State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 767 N.Y.S.2d 451 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (wetlands
regulation leaving owner only five percent of the value of the land was held a taking).
77
See Echevarrieta v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 165,
173-74 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding tree-trimming regulation to protect views).
78
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1980).
79
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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maintain a home on the property might be viewed as allowing
adequate economic use to defeat a regulatory taking claim.
Legislation that enacts the provisions of a conservation
easement could also be analogized to a growth-management
program that permanently bars development. Under TahoeSierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency,80 such a program would be vulnerable to a takings
challenge. Tahoe refused to hold that a temporary moratorium
was a per se taking, but the Court indicated that a moratorium
of an excessive duration might be unconstitutional as applied
to a particular landowner. Moratoria over a year could be
treated with “special skepticism.” Accordingly, it would appear
that a “permanent moratorium” would not be upheld under the
Tahoe analysis.81 There are thus substantial policy, practical,
and legal arguments against imposing the more stringent
aspects of conservation easements through public regulation,
rather than through agreement with consenting owners.
Municipalities could be required not only to pay litigation
expenses and damage awards but also to needlessly exhaust
reputation and civic capital through overextensive regulation.
C.

Flexibility

The perpetual duration of most conservation easements
preserves land forever and supports environmental goals. Under
a conservation easement, the easement holder has a permanent,
enforceable property interest in the burdened land. By contrast,
zoning and other public land use regulation can be amended.
Moreover, government officials who make rezoning decisions are
often heavily influenced by short-term needs and special-interest
lobbying, such as the desire to raise additional revenue through
development and the specter of looming elections.82 Conservation
easements therefore have the advantage of perpetual
preservation, which frees them from the usual legislative
vagaries implicit in legislative conservation efforts.
The permanent aspect of conservation easements,
however, may present inflexible barriers to land use changes
that are necessary to satisfy society’s evolving needs. In rare
cases, circumstances may change in such a way that it becomes
80

535 U.S. 302 (2002).
See generally Monks v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 84 Cal. Rptr. 3d 75
(Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
82
See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 4, at 1055.
81
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necessary to modify or perhaps terminate a conservation
easement in order to maximize social welfare for current and
future generations.83 Evolving climate and environmental
conditions coupled with scientific advances may alter our view
of what is valuable to preserve, making it sensible to shift
development to land that is subject to an easement but is no
longer ecologically important.84 Moreover, in some cases, social,
economic, technological, and human developments may require
that a conserved parcel be used to serve other needs. Given a
paucity of alternative viable sites, there may come a point, for
example, when land burdened by an easement will be better
suited for development in order to allow for some other
pressing social need, such as to provide employment in an
economically depressed area or to construct affordable housing
in a previously exclusionary community. Competing visions of
environmental necessity may clash as well. For example, land
under an easement may be the optimal site for a solar-panel
field or wind turbines, even though such structures and surface
disturbances would violate the easement’s terms.85
As a result, some situations may arise where it will be
necessary to modify or even terminate a conservation
easement.86 When the parties cannot agree to a modification or
termination, judicial action may be necessary under realcovenant doctrines such as changed conditions, relative
83

Specious attempts to invoke public policy should be rejected by the courts.
See Gresczyk v. Landis, No. HHDCV044004887, 2006 WL 1644545, at *7 (Conn. Super.
Ct. May 25, 2006) (“The plaintiff’s complaint seeks to enforce a deed restriction on the
defendant’s property under the farmland preservation program. The defendant’s claim
that golf courses are environmentally friendly, if true, is legally and factually
uncoupled from the issue of whether the development of [the property] as a golf
course . . . is prohibited on this property as a matter of law by the terms of the deed to
the state and the provisions of the [farmland preservation easement statute].”).
84
See Cornelia Dean, The Preservation Predicament, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2008, at F1 (quoting Healy Hamilton, director of the Center for Biodiversity Research
and Information at the California Academy of Sciences: “We have over a 100-year
investment nationally in a large suite of protected areas that may no longer protect the
target ecosystems for which they were formed . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
85
See Todd Woody, Desert Vistas vs. Solar Power, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2009,
at B1 (A report concerning a solar panel field challenge by environmentalists was
unclear as to whether the conservation interest was a fee or easement, but the conflict
would be the same in either situation); Eileen M. Adams, Residents to Decide on Town
Ownership
of
Lots,
RIVER
VALLEY
SUN
J.
(Dec.
1,
2009),
http://www.sunjournal.com/node/636647 (reporting on town meeting to discuss
rescinding town’s conservation easement so that six wind towers could be built).
86
Some commentators are deeply troubled by modification and termination, and
suggest strong procedural and substantive safeguards to perpetuity. See discussion in
connection with cy pres, infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. While I believe that
modification and especially termination should be rather uncommon occurrences, they are
inevitable as the law needs to accommodate changes and the needs of future generations.
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hardship, and the prohibition of covenants violating public
policy.87 It would be better, however, if the parties to the
easement could agree to alter the easement, since this would
save time and litigation costs. Moreover, because the parties
have “bought in” to the change, this would likely yield a more
lasting and effective arrangement. It is therefore important that
the legal rules and norms governing the easement holder allow
necessary, consensual alterations of conservation easements.
This is essential with both governmental and NPO easements.
The next section will examine the relative capabilities of
government and nonprofit holders to alter easements by consent.
D.

Local, Democratic Governance

As described above,88 nonprofit organizations are not
bound by public land use plans in acquiring conservation
easements, and some might accept easements that do not
result in a meaningful conservation easement plan. As also
described above, governmental conservation easements that
are subject to a plan may be more effective vehicles.
Similarly, with respect to modification and termination,
the presence of public input, process, and control in the
governmental easement context might also bring superior
results when compared to NPO easements. An NPO easement
holder would decide this important matter of local land use
solely by reference to its conservation mission, free from public
scrutiny and accountability.89 Moreover, because an easement
87

See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 4, at 1076-81. In
Northampton Twp. v. Parsons, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 607, rev’d, 2011 Pa.
Commw. Unpub. LEXIS 549, the court applied the doctrine of relative hardship and
refused to order the fee owner to remove a barn built in violation of a governmentallyheld conservation easement. The fee owner had permitted the public to use the
basketball courts housed in the barn. The court explained:
Under this very unique set of facts, the harm that [the Parsons] and the
community would suffer by having to remove this structure is far greater
than the harm [the Township] will suffer if the pole barn remains on the
property. If the pole barn is removed, [the Parsons] will suffer financially in
the both the costs of constructing the barn as well as the cost of removing it,
and the community will suffer the loss of this valuable resource. . . . [The
Parsons] have been ordered to dedicate an equal amount of land in open
space, and therefore [the Township] will not suffer the loss of dedicated land.
Id. at 16-17.
88
See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
89
Stressing their desire to maintain state and local, rather than federal,
control over Alaskan land issues, state legislators in Alaska introduced a resolution
urging the federal government to assume control of New York City’s Central Park.
Andy Newman, From Alaska, Great Concern for Central Park, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26,
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can be held in gross, the nonprofit may be located some
distance away, enabling an absent entity to singlehandedly
decide a key local concern, without understanding local issues
and priorities. By contrast, a government easement holder
faced with an alteration proposal would be bound to achieve
the broader public interest and would not be restricted by a
conservation mission.90 Its decision would be made in public
view, likely through open hearings, with due consideration of
local issues and values by officials accountable to voters for
their decisions.91 Thus, this essential land use decision would
remain in the hands of a participatory, democratic process. As
in easement acquisition, there are always concerns of rent
seeking in modification requests,92 but one can hope that the
democratic process will serve as a check.
Governmentally held conservation easements are
therefore valuable vehicles for land preservation. As compared
to NPO-held easements and public land use regulation, they
have certain benefits and disadvantages in terms of achieving
efficiency, avoiding coercion, providing flexibility, and enabling
local democratic governance. The following section examines a
number of problem areas that can arise with governmental
conservation easements, and it suggests how they can be
mitigated and even avoided.
III.

MAXIMIZING BENEFITS OF GOVERNMENTAL
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

This section examines potential issues related to
government-held conservation easements that must be skillfully
addressed in order to maximize the efficiency, noncoercion,
flexibility, and governance benefits of governmental easements.
These issues include nonconsensual acquisition through eminent
domain and exactions, procedural impediments to governmental
administration of easements, and statutory controls on
modification and termination of conservation easements.

2012, 6:58 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/26/from-afar-great-concernfor-central-park/. Presumably this was to make a point rather than a serious proposal,
but it speaks of a concern about distant control of local lands.
90
See Friends of Shawangunks, Inc. v. Clark, 754 F.2d 446, 452 (2d Cir.
1985) (describing the process in enforcing a particular conservation easement).
91
There are gaps in the protection of the electoral process—those who live
nearby and might want to move into the municipality have no vote. Neither do the
unborn future generations who must clean up any mess left by today’s citizens.
92
See supra Part II.A.4.
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Nonconsensual Acquisition
1. Eminent-Domain Takings of Easements

There is a divergence among state legislation on the
question of whether governmental entities may use eminent
domain to create conservation easements. Moreover, even
where this practice is authorized by statute, it is unclear
whether courts in the current climate would sustain the use of
eminent domain to establish conservation easements.
There are competing policy considerations related to the
government’s use of eminent domain to take conservation
easements. By definition, eminent-domain takings are not
consensual, and as a result, they may not be able to achieve the
efficiency benefits of a negotiated easement sale.93 Eminent
domain is necessary, however, to overcome holdouts that would
otherwise frustrate rational government infrastructure and
services—for example, government infrastructure in the form
of roads, which generally must run in organized patterns and
cannot endlessly jog around parcels. Similarly, eminent domain
may be necessary and justifiable to acquire parcels with high
conservation values, such as open land in otherwise developed
areas, properties with unique ecological features, or tracts
necessary to complete a conservation program, such as a scenic
vista or watershed.
As a result of these competing policy views, states
diverge as to whether conservation easements may be created
by an eminent-domain taking.94 Some state statutes are silent
on the matter,95 while others expressly grant governmental
units the power to acquire conservation easements by eminent
domain,96 and still others expressly prohibit such takings.97 The
Third Restatement of Property contemplates the creation of
conservation easements by eminent domain, which finds some
93

See supra Part II.A.
For an overview, see Lara Womack Daniel & James D. Timmons,
Conservation Easements and Eminent Domain at the Intersection: How Modern Legal
Creations Meet Constitutional Principles, 36 REAL EST. L.J. 433 (2008).
95
See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, Prefatory Note (1981) (leaving to
states to determine this question).
96
See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/1 (West 2010); 32 PA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 5005(c)(1), 5008 (West 1996).
97
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06(2) (West 2012); IOWA CODE § 457A.1
(West 2012). See generally ACCO Unlimited Corp. v. City of Johnston, 611 N.W.2d 506
(Iowa 2000) (rejecting owners’ assertions that taking of land for flood control purposes
was the taking of a conservation easement that was barred by statute).
94
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support from case law.98 In one recent case, for example, a court
upheld the state’s use of eminent domain to acquire a
conservation easement on four acres of a church’s property,
which was part of a plan to mitigate the destruction of one
hundred acres of upland forest and other terrestrial habitat as
a result of the roadway’s expansion to serve a regional airport.99
One possible question is whether eminent-domain
takings to create conservation easements satisfy the “public
use” requirement.100 Governments have traditionally taken
affirmative easements—where the government or public has
the right to do something on the targeted land, which supports
the proposition that the easement serves a public use.101 Thus,
governmental acquisitions of rights of way for utilities,
roadways, and similar easements have been routinely
permitted as meeting the public use test.102 Airplane flights over
property—which may constitute compensable takings103—also
involve affirmative physical intrusions of public carriers on the
property in a manner similar to public roadways on land.
Indeed, courts have shown a willingness to stretch this
physical-intrusion rationale, finding that the noise these flights
generate can also rise to the level of a compensable taking and
permitting airport neighbors to receive compensation even
where they do not experience direct overflights.104 By contrast,
conservation easements typically do not give the government
holder or the public a general right to physical access and
therefore might fail to satisfy the public use requirement under
this line of cases.105
Thus, governments must demonstrate a different,
nonphysical “public use” in order to uphold the creation of a
98

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.18 cmt. h (2000).
See State v. Korean Methodist Church of N.H., 949 A.2d 738 (N.H. 2008).
100
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution requires “public use” and “just
compensation” to sustain an eminent-domain taking. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
101
See GERALD KORNGOLD, PRIVATE LAND USE ARRANGEMENTS: EASEMENTS,
REAL COVENANTS, AND EQUITABLE SERVITUDES § 2.02 (2d ed. 2004).
102
See, e.g., Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land in
Montgomery Cnty., Md., 549 F. Supp. 584 (D. Md. 1982) (subway tunnel easement);
City of Huntsville v. Rowe, 889 So. 2d 553 (Ala. 2004) (sewer easement); Liberty Dev.
Corp. v. Metro. Utils. Dist. of Omaha, 751 N.W.2d 608 (Neb. 2008) (utilities easement).
103
See, e.g., Griggs v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
104
See, e.g., Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 376 P.2d 100 (Or. 1962); Martin v.
Port of Seattle, 391 P.2d 540 (Wash. 1964).
105
Some might argue that a governmental holder with a right of occasional
physical access under the easement document has physical access. See Korngold,
Contentious Issues, supra note 4. That argument may be received sympathetically by a
court or seen as boot strapping.
99
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conservation easement as a valid exercise of eminent domain.
In Kelo v. City of New London, the Supreme Court held that a
taking pursuant to a comprehensive, legislatively approved
economic-redevelopment plan served a public use.106 Similarly,
proponents would argue that an eminent-domain taking,
pursuant to a plan and supporting environmental policies,
benefits the public in a manner that also satisfies the public
use test. Nevertheless, in light of the strong anti-Kelo reaction
and state-law changes that narrow the permissible criteria for
eminent domain, governments may face additional roadblocks
to finding a public use in conservation easement takings.107
2. Exacted Conservation Easements
Developers may also grant conservation easements to
governmental entities as a condition to favorable zoning or other
governmental approvals, or to mitigate environmental damage
caused by development.108 These easements are not likely part of
106

See Kelo v. City of New London, 546 U.S. 469 (2005).
After Kelo, over forty states enacted changes in their eminent domain rules
in reaction to Kelo’s finding that economic development was a permissible “public use.”
See Andrew P. Morriss, Symbol or Substance? An Empirical Assessment of State
Responses to Kelo, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 237 (2009); Ilya Somin, The Limits of
Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2012 (2009). The
Kelo decision has been highly criticized. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Public Use in a
Post-Kelo World, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 151 (2009); Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An
American Original, 8 GREEN BAG 2d 355 (2005); Gideon Kanner, The Public Use
Clause: Constitutional Mandate or “Hortatory Fluff?” 33 PEPP. L. REV. 335 (2006);
Daniel B. Kelly, The “Public Use” Requirement in Eminent Domain: A Rationale Based
on Secret Purchases and Private Influence, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2006); Marc Mihaly
& Turner Smith, Kelo’s Trail: A Survey of State and Federal Legislative and Judicial
Activity Five Years Later, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 703, 706-08 (2011). There are few scholarly
articles supporting Kelo. One noteworthy exception supporting the decision is Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1412
(2006). I too have written in support. Gerald Korngold, Resolving the Intergenerational
Conflicts of Real Property Law: Preserving Free Markets and Personal Autonomy for
Future Generations, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1525, 1578-81 (2007).
108
See, generally, e.g., Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 481 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 2007) (conditioning special use permit on the
granting of a conservation easement); St. John’s River Water Mgmt. v. Koontz, 861 So.
2d 1267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (challenge to exaction); Conservation Law Found.,
Inc. v. Town of Lincolnville, 786 A.2d 616 (Me. 2001) (approving conditioning of
subdivision approval on the granting of conservation easement under ordinance
requirement that a subdivision “will not have undue adverse effect on the scenic or
natural beauty of the area”); Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214 (N.Y. 2004)
(constitutional challenge to exaction of conservation easement); see also Grosscup v.
Pantano, 725 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (describing negotiation between state
Department of Environmental Protection and owner yielding agreement to create
conservation easement as mitigation); Cal. Oak Found. v. Cnty. of Tehama, No.
C066415, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 3970 (Cal. Ct. App. May 25, 2012)
(conservation easement required to mitigate loss of 774 acres of blue oak woodland
107
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a broader pattern of easements, but they are theoretically
acquired in response to a perceived threat that development
poses to a governmental regulatory or planning scheme. As with
other exactions, there is a risk that governments will use the
land-approval process to extort property rights from developers
who cannot afford the time, delay, and expense to challenge the
request in court.
a. The Legacy of Nollan and Dolan
The limits of governmental exactions have been shaped
by the Supreme Court in Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard.109 In order to sustain
an exaction against an owner’s claim of an uncompensated
governmental taking, Nollan requires that there be an
“essential nexus” between the condition imposed on
development—that is, the exaction—and a “legitimate
government interest.”110 In the absence of such a requirement,
government could use the exaction process to obtain a
concession from the owner for “some valid governmental
purpose, but without payment of compensation.”111 This would
amount to “an out-and-out plan of extortion” by government.112
Adding to the “nexus” requirement, Dolan mandates a
“rough proportionality” between the extent of the exaction and
the projected negative impact of the proposed development. In
Dolan, a landowner sought a permit to double the footprint of
her store and also pave a parking lot on a parcel she owned. The
resulting from 3000 acres of home development; easement on almost twice as many
acres as lost); Citizens for Open Gov’t v. City of Lodi, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 459 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2012) (developer’s creation of conservation easements on other property helped
meet mitigation burden necessary for granting of conditional use permit to allow
shopping center); Ballona Wetlands Land Trust v. City of Los Angeles, 134 Cal. Rptr.
3d 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (describing California regulatory procedure for protecting
archaeological sites in exchange for approval of surrounding development by use of
conservation easements); Chelsea Inv. Grp. v. Chelsea, 792 N.W.2d 781 (Mich. Ct. App.
2010) (under PUD agreement, owner conveyed conservation easement on
approximately 30 acres); Town of Beloit v. Cnty. of Rock, 657 N.W.2d 344 (Wis. 2003)
(town conditioned development on creation of conservation easement); John Laidler,
Senior Housing Planned at Former N. Andover Ski Area, BOS. GLOBE, Mar. 22, 2012, at
GN3 (conservation restriction on undeveloped portion required in exchange for special
use permit to allow building of 133-unit senior living community on former ski area);
Jessica Owley, Exacted Conservation Easements: Emerging Concerns with Enforcement,
26 PROB. & PROP., no. 1, Jan./Feb. 2012, at 51.
109
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
110
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
111
Id.
112
Id.
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city was willing to grant the permit, provided that the owner
would dedicate a part of the floodplain on the property as a
greenway and also establish a fifteen-foot-wide pedestrian and
bike path adjacent to the greenway. The total dedication was
approximately 10 percent of the 1.67-acre parcel. The desired
greenway was consistent with the city’s recently adopted master
drainage plan, which was designed to reduce flooding in areas
along waterways, as well as the city’s comprehensive land use
plan, which called for bike and pedestrian paths to encourage
alternatives to automobile transportation.
The Dolan court indicated that the city could have
prohibited the owner from building in the floodplain under the
police power, but that the city had gone further by requiring
the property to be dedicated to the city as a greenway and
permitting the public to cross the owner’s land. With respect to
the bicycle and pedestrian pathway, “the city [had] not met its
burden of demonstrating that the additional number of vehicle
and bicycle trips generated by [the] development reasonably
relate to the city’s requirement for a dedication of the
pedestrian/bicycle pathway easement.”113 Thus, Dolan places a
limit on a municipality’s ability to unfairly demand concessions
from owners seeking to develop their land.
b. Application to Conservation Easements
The rule and reasoning of Dolan should apply to
conservation easement exactions, as well. The exaction in
Dolan through dedication by the owner is functionally
equivalent to an owner’s grant of a conservation easement to
the city. Both involve the transfer of property rights to the city
that result in development restrictions.114 Indeed, courts have

113

Dolan, 512 U.S. at 395.
States have limited the exaction power. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41,
§ 81R (1955) (“No rule or regulation shall require, and no planning board shall impose,
as a condition for the approval of a plan of a subdivision, that any of the land within
said subdivision be dedicated to the public use, or conveyed or released to the
commonwealth or to the county, city or town in which the subdivision is located, for use
as a public way, public park or playground, or for any other public purpose, without
just compensation to the owner thereof.”); Collings v. Planning Bd. of Stow, 947 N.E.2d
78 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011) (holding that the provision barred a town from requiring
dedication of open space with public access as a condition of subdivision approval, even
if the town waived certain subdivision requirements in exchange). It is unclear whether
the exaction of a typical conservation easement that does not include public access
would fall within the statute’s purview.
114
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applied Nollan and Dolan when determining the permissibility
of exactions requiring conservation restrictions.115
In Smith v. Town of Mendon,116 several portions of the
property at issue were located in environmental protection
overlay districts (EPODs) that the town code had created. The
code required development permits in these areas, but permits
were granted so long as the owners could show that their
activities would not disturb the environmental conditions.117
The Smiths, as landowners, submitted a site plan seeking
approval to construct a home on the non-EPOD portions of
their land. Upon review, the town planning board found that
this development would not result in adverse environmental
effects, as long as the Smiths did not develop in the EPOD
areas. Accordingly, the board conditioned final site approval on
the requirement that the Smiths file a conservation
restriction—in the form of a covenant running with the land—
that would prohibit development within the EPOD areas.
Under these circumstances, however, the court held that no
unconstitutional taking had occurred.118
In reaching its holding, the court refused to analyze the
town’s permit condition as an exaction under the Nollan and
Dolan framework. Instead, the court examined whether the
town’s action was appropriate under the regulatory takings
tests of Palazzolo, Agins, and Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York.119 Not surprisingly, the court concluded
that the town’s permit condition was proper under these cases’
more forgiving standards. In support of its determination that
Nollan and Dolan did not apply, the Smith court first recited
the Supreme Court’s definition of an exaction as “the
conditioning of a land-use decision on the ‘dedication of
115

See Rocky Mountain Christian Church v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 481 F.
Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 2007) (ordinance required special use permit for churches
above certain size; county required conveyance of conservation easement over fourteen
of the church’s 54.4 acre parcel in exchange for approval of special use application
related to building plan; held that RLUIPA claims were ripe, but statute of limitations
had run on inverse condemnation claim based on the granting of the conservation
easement); St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 861 So. 2d 1267, 1268-69 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (Pleus, J., concurring) (court dismissed, on ripeness grounds,
challenge to mitigation demands of government agency requiring conservation deed
restrictions; concurring opinion stating that “I also hope that the District will stop the
extortionate demands on property owners which this case demonstrates.”).
116
822 N.E.2d 1214, 1215 (N.Y. 2004).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001); Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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property to public use.’”120 The court then concluded that
“[t]here is no such dedication of ‘property’ here.”121 Indeed, the
court explained that both Nollan and Dolan “involved the
transfer of the most important ‘stick’ in the proverbial bundle
of property rights, the right to exclude others.”122 On the other
hand, the court argued that the Smiths’ loss could be
distinguished since it was far less severe, finding that “[i]f it is
a property right, . . . it is trifling compared to the rights to
exclude or alienate.”123
The Smith court’s analysis is unconvincing for a variety
of reasons. First, “property” includes more than just the right
to exclude. For example, “property” might also include the right
to possession, which, for the Smiths, is now limited by the
town’s perpetual ownership interest in the Smith property.
Indeed, the town now exerts control through a regime of in rem
rights rather than through a regulatory process that is subject
to public, constitutional, and legislative processes and
controls.124 Under the court’s logic, municipalities could require
restrictive covenants that paralleled the existing zoning
regulations from every landowner seeking a permit without
triggering Nollan and Dolan. The court’s attitude runs counter
to the legislature’s clear mandate which declares conservation
easements to be property interests.125
Second, if the restriction did not give the town an extra
right in the Smith property, then why would the town have
requested it? The court explained that the recorded restriction
would provide notice to subsequent purchasers and “the most
meaningful and responsible means of protecting the EPODs.”126
Providing notice to purchasers, however, is not an adequate
justification. Indeed, black-letter law provides that purchasers
acquire property subject to zoning and land use regulations.127
Moreover, there is no reason why EPOD legislation requires
120

Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d at 1219 (quoting City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999)).
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Moreover, one case recently held that a restriction created in 1940 by an
owner of a historic home in order to get special permit approval for subdivision was not
subject to the state’s marketable title act that generally limits the term of restrictions
to thirty years. Killorin v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Andover, 935 N.E.2d 315, 316
(Mass. App. Ct. 2011).
125
UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, §§ 1(1), 3, prefatory note (1981).
126
Id. § 3; 822 N.E.2d at 1216.
127
See, e.g., Rosique v. Windley Cove, Ltd., 542 So. 2d 1014, 1015-16 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1989); Josefowicz v. Porter, 108 A.2d 865, 866-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1954).
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special treatment. Accordingly, although the town might have
preferred a recorded restriction, it cannot obtain such an
advantage by unilaterally compelling the landowner to deed
away their rights.
The court underplayed the extent of the rights the town
extracted from the Smiths, explaining that “[t]he terms of the
proposed ‘Grant of Conservation Restriction’ mirrored the
preexisting EPOD regulations, differing in only a few
respects.”128 The court then acknowledged that the proposed
grant would restrict the property in perpetuity, while the town
could still amend the EPOD ordinance and thus create
inconsistency between the grant and the ordinance. Although
this may not have been important for the court, most owners
would likely view the relinquishment of a perpetual land right
as significant. Moreover, the court stated that the restriction
could be enforced by injunction while ordinance violations could
be enforced only by the issuance of citations. Again, most owners
would likely deem these divergent legal ramifications significant.
Accordingly, it seems clear that the grant of an in rem, perpetual,
and enforceable property right is a significant loss.
Notwithstanding the Smith decision, the lessons of
Dolan apply with particular force when analyzing the validity
of exacted conservation easements. The concern over
“extortion” of conservation easements in exchange for permits,
for example, apparently underlies a California statute that
provides, “no local governmental entity may condition the
issuance of an entitlement for use on the applicant’s granting of
a conservation easement.”129 As one court explained:
One purpose of [the statute] is to insure that such conveyances to
public entities are, in fact, voluntary . . . . [It] prevents a government
entity from requiring an involuntary conveyance of a conservation
easement and thus, protects the landowner from an unreasonable
taking of property rights.130

Therefore, exactions of conservation easements pose a
risk of violating property rights. Sound policy and the
128

Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d at 1216.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.3 (West 2007). The California courts, however, have
held in various contexts that the statute did not apply to bar easement exactions. See,
e.g., San Mateo Cnty. Coastal Landowners’ Ass’n v. County of San Mateo, 45 Cal. Rptr.
2d 117, 124 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that easements in question were not exacted
under 815 but pursuant to other authority); Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of Cent. Cal. v. County
of Stanislaus, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (statute did not apply
where owner arranged for third party to grant easements).
130
Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 118 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 480, 487.
129

2013]

GOVERNMENTAL CONSERVATION EASEMENTS

497

Constitution demand that such exactions meet the requirements
of Nollan and Dolan in order to avoid invalid takings of property.
c. Going Forward
Despite the issues highlighted above, exacted
conservation easements offer a legitimate way to force
developers to internalize their projects’ environmental costs.
Accordingly, these easements may embody sound policy, and
they will typically pass constitutional muster—provided that the
government ensures the nexus and proportionality requirements
are met. If the exaction cannot satisfy these requirements,
however, it will start to resemble simple extortion and power
politics, permitting neighbors to extract rents through public
officials who are anxious to placate them. Of course, this would
run counter to the noncoercive benefits that consensual
conservation easements can provide. Moreover, if neighbors
and municipal officials are extracting gratuitous benefits that
they should really be paying for, their conduct would create
inefficiencies in land use.
B.

Procedural Impediments to Benefits of Governmental
Easements

In order to unlock the efficiency, flexibility, and
governance advantages of governmental easements, rules of
standing, mandamus, and cy pres must be delineated in a manner
that strikes the right balance between the need for judicial review
and the need to defer to legislative and executive judgments.
Where government officials clearly neglect their duties or act
without process, citizens need access to courts. But there are
significant costs to allowing the decisions of accountable, duly
elected public officials to be replaced by judicial decisions
emerging from expensive litigation whose very nature is to
second-guess matters that may be best left to the representative
and
political
process.
Furthermore,
the
substantive
requirements of cy pres in particular pose a unique threat to the
good administration of governmental conservation easements.
1. Standing
a. Policy Framework
By recognizing private citizens’ standing to sue and
permitting independent enforcement of governmentally held
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conservation easements, courts threaten the dual goals of
flexibility and democratic control over local land use decisions.
Conservation easements create public rights. Citizens should
not be able to convert conservation easements into private
benefits by enforcing them individually and thereby increasing
the value of their own properties. While it is true that
government acquisition of a conservation easement may
increase the value of neighboring land, the benefit is fortuitous.
Neighbors should not have a right to enforce an easement when
government has decided to alter its scope and application.
Government is the appropriate entity to balance
competing public goals in easement modification decisions.
Indeed, government actors are accountable for their decisions
through the ballot box, and their decision-making processes are
subject to procedural controls.131 Both of these features help
provide public oversight of governmental actions. State
regulation addressing the disposal of public real property also
helps to ensure public protection.132 Courts should neither
second-guess governmental decisions that were properly
reached nor force government to defend private enforcement
actions with the effect of depleting the public purse.
The policy reasons that support generally placing limits
on standing apply to private enforcement of governmental
conservation restrictions, as well. For example, the requirement
that a plaintiff suffer specific injury helps preserve separation of
powers by preventing the judiciary from conducting a
generalized examination of legislative decisions.133 Additionally,
because the outcome may foreclose the rights of others through
collateral estoppel or res judicata, standing doctrine also ensures
that the plaintiff has adequate “skin in the game” to actively and
effectively conduct the litigation.134

131

See, e.g., Thomas v. Beaumont Heritage Soc’y, 339 S.W.3d 893, 896-97
(Tex. App. 2011) (granting historical association and individual standing under Texas
Open Meetings Act to challenge school board decision to demolish a building); see also
Soussa v. Denville Twp. Planning Bd., 568 A.2d 1225, 1226-27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1990) (indicating that a court could decide how the public interest should be
represented in determination of enforceability of an open space covenant).
132
See infra Part III.C.
133
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see also
Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 450, 496 (2008).
134
See Douglas v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n of Town of Watertown, 13 A.3d
669, 673 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (“[J]udicial decisions which may affect the rights of others
are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented . . . .”).
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b. Case Decisions
Several recent cases show that there are divergent
approaches to the issue of standing in the enforcement of
conservation easements. In Bjork v. Draper,135 the prior owners of
the property, the Grays, granted a conservation easement to the
Lake Forest Open Lands Association. The easement prohibited
changes to the historical residence on the property, construction
of additional buildings and improvements (except for a 1500square-foot addition), and alterations of the lawn and
landscaped grounds. The deed specifically provided, however,
that enforcement of the easement was at the discretion of the
association. The Drapers subsequently purchased the burdened
property and took various actions that raised questions about
whether they had violated the restrictions.
First, the Drapers sought to build a 1900-square-foot
addition on the property, which exceeded the original easement
deed’s square footage allowance. Nevertheless, the association
consented to the larger addition in return for the Drapers’
agreement to replace the house’s aluminum siding with wooden
siding, which would restore the house to its original condition.
Second, the Drapers altered some landscaping on the lot by
adding new shrubs. When the association learned of these
prohibited changes, it entered into an agreement with the
Drapers regarding landscaping. Finally, the association agreed
to eliminate a portion of the easement to allow the Drapers to
build a driveway turnaround in exchange for the Drapers’
designation of an equally sized easement on land that the
original easement did not cover. The parties released 809
square feet from easement coverage, or 3.2% of the total size of
the easement property.
The parties’ actions made sense from a practical,
conservation, and policy perspective. Indeed, best practices
require an ongoing dialogue between burdened property
owners and easement holders in order to monitor easement
enforcement, discuss potential problems, and make changes
necessary to ensure the viability of both the easement and the
fee owner’s use of the property.136 As a result, the parties’ first
exchange led to a “win” for the association and the Drapers: the
135

Bjork v. Draper, 886 N.E.2d 563 (Ill. App. Ct.), leave to appeal denied, 897
N.E.2d 249 (2008), and aff’d, 936 N.E.2d 763 (2010), and subsequent leave to appeal
denied, 943 N.E.2d 1099 (2011).
136
See Korngold, Contentious Issues, supra note 4, at 1062.
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association exercised its discretion to secure restoration of the
exterior of the house, which it believed was well worth the
additional 400 square feet, and the Drapers received permission
to build an addition to the scale they desired. And while few
details emerged on the nature of the exchanges surrounding the
landscaping agreement and the easement amendment, there is
no evidence that the association exercised its discretion contrary
to its mission. The association, like a governmental holder,
should be able to make these decisions about easement
enforcement and modification in order to promote flexibility
and pursue overarching conservation values.
So what was the problem? Unfortunately for the parties,
Illinois legislation provided that owners within 500 feet of land
subject to a conservation easement have standing to enforce
it.137 The legislature’s impulse is understandable. In order to
ensure that the benefits of conservation easements remain
available to the public, it empowered a cadre of “private
attorneys general” in the form of nearby property owners to
enforce the easement. The effect of the legislation, however, can
be perverse. It could allow neighbors to extract a private benefit
(namely, the continuation of an easement arrangement that only
serves the personal goals of neighbors), when the purpose of the
easement, the overall conservation easement authorization, and
the federal and state tax subsidies is to benefit the public. Bjork
frames the harm arising from the Drapers’ landscaping
changes as interference with the public’s ability to view the
property and its open, scenic qualities from ground level on
adjacent, publicly accessible land. But did the plaintiffs receive
a special benefit from that view as nearby owners? Did their
access to such a view enhance the value of their property?
Although the case does not discuss this issue, one wonders if
their attempt to enforce the restriction benefitted the views from
plaintiffs’ property and enhanced their value. Unfortunately, the
Illinois statute allows private plaintiffs to extract a private
benefit through enforcement of public conservation easements,
particularly where the easement holder has decided to modify
the easement or refuses to enforce it.
The initial appellate opinion held that the amendment
permitting the land swap for the driveway turnaround was
impermissible under the terms of the original easement.
Moreover, on remand, the trial court held that the oversized
137

765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 120/4 (LexisNexis 2010).
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addition of 1900 square feet violated the easement.138 These
decisions ignored the practical give and take—a necessary
component of effective easement stewardship and enforcement—
as well as the expertise of the easement holder. Instead, at the
request of unrelated, private individuals, the courts imposed their
own views of a relatively minor issue onto the agreement between
the easement holder and fee owner.139 One can only imagine the
amount of money this nonprofit organization was forced to spend
on legal fees in several trials and appeals in this matter, rather
than on land conservation activities. Accordingly, the Illinois
standing statute is ill-advised. Moreover, while Bjork involved
an NPO easement, its lessons about third-party standing apply
with equal force to governmental easements, as well.
In contrast, the court in McEvoy v. Palumbo took a
narrow view of third-party standing, leaving appropriate
discretion to the town legislature.140 There, defendant Palumbo
and plaintiff McEvoy owned neighboring parcels of land, but their
separate parcels once belonged to a common owner, who had
granted a conservation easement over the larger tract to the town
of Woodbury. The conservation easement barred the “cutting of
trees or plants . . . or disturbance of change in the natural habitat
in any manner . . . .”141 Pursuant to a request by Palumbo, the
town granted him the right to remove invasive species and mow a
portion of his land subject to the easement. But when Palumbo
later mowed the property, McEvoy brought suit against the town
and Palumbo seeking to enjoin future cutting.
The court rejected McEvoy’s request, finding that the
selectmen had statutory authority to act for the town in such
matters142 and that McEvoy lacked standing pursuant to a
specific statutory provision.143 For support, the court cited the
state’s conservation easement statute, which expressly grants
the attorney general standing to enforce conservation
easements, and held that the legislation did not provide
138

Bjork, 936 N.E.2d at 769.
Fortunately, the appellate court on the second appeal upheld the trial
court’s application of the relative-hardship doctrine. As a result, while the turnaround
and new trees had to be removed and relocated, the oversize addition did not have to be
removed or reduced. Id. at 772-73. In any event, as a matter of policy, one might
wonder whether this amount of litigation is appropriate in order to secure what turned
out to be a comparatively small remedy.
140
McEvoy v. Palumbo, CV106002253S, 2011 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2939
(Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 15, 2011).
141
Id. at *3 (alteration in original).
142
Id. at *4.
143
Id. at *8.
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standing to any other parties.144 Additionally, because the town
and Palumbo’s actions did not cause specific injury to McEvoy’s
legal interest, the court also held that McEvoy lacked standing
under general standing principles.145
The court apparently recognized the value of permitting
a lawful easement holder to voluntarily modify agreements:
[T]he plaintiff seeks to arrogate unto herself the right to determine
when and how the town should exercise the discretion conferred
upon it in the grant. The plaintiff has no legal right to compel the
town to defer to her views as to when and how to exercise its
discretion, and she has no standing to assert and litigate the claims
in her complaint.146

Accordingly, the refusal to recognize third-party standing in
McEvoy demonstrates how courts can simultaneously satisfy the
goals of flexibility and democratic control of local land issues.147
Similarly, the court in Zagrans v. Elek correctly held
that neighbors lacked standing to challenge an owner’s
modification agreement that was subject to conservation
easements.148 In that case, the owners of property adjacent to a
park granted conservation easements to the county park
district.149 Subsequently, the park district entered into a
modification agreement with one of the ensuing owners to
144

Id. at *7-8.
Id. at *8-9.
Id. at *14.
147
Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., No. 0228, 2012 WL
468245 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012), depublished by 46 A.3d 473 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2012), provides another example. Plaintiffs claimed standing to challenge decisions
under governmentally-held conservation easements under three theories. First,
plaintiffs alleged standing as third-party beneficiaries of the easement agreement. This
was rejected by the court, which found that their status as neighbors and owners of
properties also bound by conservation easements did not give them a right to bring an
action. Rather, the court stated that the agreement made clear that the state had the
right of enforcement. As discussed below, the court also (correctly) rejected standing
based on charitable trust law. See infra Part III.B.3. While the court in Long Green
Valley got most of the issues right, one aspect of its decision is troubling. The court felt
compelled to apply to the case at hand a recent Maryland Supreme Court opinion that
extended the rule that neighbors had standing in zoning cases to a challenge by a
neighbor that a land disposition agreement by the city and a developer under an urban
renewal plan was ultra vires or illegal. See 120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 964 A.2d 662, 673 (Md. 2009). The Long Green Valley court thus held that
the individual plaintiffs should be considered as “prima facie aggrieved” and thus
entitled to standing, now placing the burden on defendants on remand to rebut that
presumption by showing a lack of special damage. Id. at 506. This is an unfortunate
extension of the standing rule, allowing public benefits to be converted to private rights
and frustrating democratic governance principles.
148
Zagrans v. Elek, No. 08CA009472, 2009 WL 1743203, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App.
June 22, 2009).
149
Id. at *1.
145
146
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release a portion of the owner’s property from the easement and
place a previously unrestricted area under the easement.150 The
property owner entered this exchange in order to build a home
on his parcel; the neighboring owners, however, sought to
enforce the easement as originally written.151 Nevertheless, the
court held that the neighbors lacked standing, given that they
neither qualified as an intended third-party beneficiary under
the original easements nor possessed the requisite special
interest for a taxpayer suit challenging a government
contract.152 As the court explained,
Appellants received a benefit from the easement conservation
agreement because, up until the Eleks sought to modify the
agreement, they were able to enjoy the aesthetics of the property and
to maintain continuity amongst the various surrounding properties,
which were also subject to conservation easements. As previously
noted, however, the mere receipt of a benefit from a contract does not
transform the recipient of that benefit into an intended beneficiary.
The Fauvers and MetroParks entered into their easement agreement
for the stated purpose of maintaining the property “in its present
state . . . for the preservation of woodlands, wetlands and wildlife.”
There is no evidence that the Fauvers and MetroParks intended to
benefit Appellants by entering into their easement agreement.
Consequently, Appellants’ argument that they were intended
beneficiaries lacks merit.153

It appeared that the court was sensitive to the neighbors’ attempt
to free ride on the public easement. The court appropriately
rejected this effort to extract a private advantage and deferred to
the judgment of the public body that held the easement.
c. Suggested Approach
The rejection of third-party standing permits
government to exercise discretion, both enabling public officials
to achieve flexibility and allowing burdened owners to enjoy
reasonable uses. Absent procedural defects or corruption,
neighbors should be limited to challenging these actions only
through the democratic process—that is, through public
advocacy and the ballot box. The law of standing is complex.154
150

Id.
Id.
152
Id. at *2-5.
153
Id. at *4.
154
See Bradford C. Mank, Reading the Standing Tea Leaves in American
Electrical Power Co. v. Connecticut, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 543, 547-48 (2012) (describing
federal “constitutional” standing, based on Article III cases and controversies
151
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It emerges from different legal standards and complex factual
situations,155 and as a result, courts balance competing policy
and factual interests in reaching their decisions on standing.156
In light of the policy concerns stressed above, courts should
exercise their discretion within this framework to limit
individual standing in the enforcement of governmental
conservation easements.157
2. Mandamus
Mandamus is typically limited to compelling a
government official or agency to perform a mandatory,
ministerial, or statutorily imperative action.158 On the other
hand, where the act involves discretion or judgment by the
government actor, a court should refuse mandamus.159
requirement and the ban on advisory opinions, and “prudential” standing rules,
designed to husband judicial resources or for other policy reasons).
155
Federal courts have developed standing rules. See, e.g., Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1998); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
162-63 (1997) (describing the “zone of interests” test); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Envtl. Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 72 (1978). State rules may follow federal rules, see,
e.g., KS Tacoma Holdings, LLC v. Shorelines Hearing Bd., 272 P.3d 876, 881 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2012) (specifically following federal “zone of interest” test), or may set their
own standards, see, e.g., Save the Plastic Bag Coal. v. City of Manhattan Beach, 254
P.3d 1005, 1012 n.3 (Cal. 2011) (specifically rejecting the federal “zone of interest” test);
Bailey v. Preserve Rural Rds. of Madison Cnty., Inc., No. 2009-SC-000417-DG, 2011
WL 6542996, at *2-4 (Ky. 2011) (requiring a “judicially cognizable interest” that is not
remote or speculative; permitting association standing); Templeton v. Town of Boone,
701 S.E.2d 709, 712 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (requiring particularized injury in fact, that
will be redressed by a favorable decision). In addition to general standing rules, some
substantive statutes may contain specific standing rules. See, e.g., In re Broad
Mountain Dev. Co., 17 A.3d 434, 439-40 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (applying standing rule
of Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code); KS Tacoma, 272 P.3d at 881 (applying
standing provisions under state Shorelines Management Act).
156
See Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 255 P.3d 80, 91-92 (Mont. 2011)
(considering the “importance of the question to the public” along with traditional factors).
157
Standing in zoning cases is often granted more easily than this article
suggests advisable for claims involving governmental conservation easements. Owners
of nearby land which has been zoned for more intensive use are usually granted
standing to challenge the ordinance. Mandelker, supra note 53, § 8.04; see, e.g., In re
Broad Mountain Dev. Co., 17 A.3d at 440; Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 93-94. The right of
neighbors is sometimes defined by statute. See, e.g., Douglas v. Planning & Zoning
Comm’n, 13 A.3d 669, 671 n.1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (owners within 100 feet, granted
standing under CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-8(a) (2007)).
158
See, e.g., Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 937 F.2d 498, 500 (10th Cir. 1991);
City of Tarpon Springs v. Planes, 30 So. 3d 693, 696 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (“[T]he
Family requested the City to take an action under the agreement that the City had a
right to refuse and did refuse. Such a case is not one for which this extraordinary writ
is available . . . .”).
159
See, e.g., Giffort Pinchot Alliance v. Butruille, 742 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (D.
Or. 1990) (“[M]andamus may not be used to direct acts within an agency’s discretion.”);
In re Milek v. Town of Hempstead, 742 N.Y.S.2d 113, 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
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Therefore, third parties are unlikely to succeed in obtaining
mandamus orders to challenge governmental decisions
regarding acquisitions, modifications, or terminations of
conservation easements. Again, this outcome in the
conservation easement context is appropriate in order to
ensure that discretion remains in the hands of accountable,
elected officials.
In Moss v. Shinn, for example, the court refused to order
that state officials either post a sign or deploy personnel to ban
bicycles, which would ensure compliance with a “hikers only”
policy on public trails.160 As the court explained, “A
determination of the resources to be devoted to enforcement
and the manner of enforcement clearly involves an exercise of
the Department’s discretion.”161 The court warned that judicial
intrusion into executive decisions would violate separation-ofpowers principles.162
On the other hand, if a statute requires procedural or
substantive conditions as a predicate to governmental action,
mandamus may be appropriate to compel compliance with these
requirements.163 Thus, in Sierra Club v. City of Hayward,
mandamus by a third party, Sierra Club, was appropriate when
the city canceled a conservation easement without following
statutory procedure and standards.164 Nevertheless, if statutory
requirements are followed, no basis exists for a mandamus
action challenging the government’s ultimate decision.165
3. Charitable Trusts and Cy Pres
A donor may transfer property to a government or
nonprofit organization in one of two ways: as an absolute gift,
or as a gift subject to a charitable trust or condition. If a court
construes the gift of a conservation easement as an absolute
gift, the government or nonprofit organization has significant
discretion in administering the easement. But if the charitabletrust doctrine applies, this opens the door to third parties to
challenge the acquisition, modification, and termination of
160

Moss v. Shinn, 775 A.2d 243, 249 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2000).
Id. at 250.
162
Id.
163
See, e.g., State ex rel. King v. Lyons, 248 P.3d 878, 886-87 (N.M. 2011).
164
See, e.g., Sierra Club v. City of Hayward, 623 P.2d 180, 182 (Cal. 1981) (city
failing to apply statutory cancellation provisions correctly by not making certain required
findings and in making other findings that were not supported by substantial evidence).
165
See Glenn’s Dairy, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 675 A.2d 781, 783 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1996).
161
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governmental and NPO conservation easements. Unfortunately,
this result may decrease the flexibility of conservation
easements, subject the government to litigation expenses, and
perhaps even replace the government holder’s vision of the
easement with the view of a third party.166
Proponents of the charitable trust classification support
it because they believe it will better protect the public’s
interest, vindicate the charitable deduction, and better respect
the perpetual nature of easements.167 On the other hand, other
commentators have rejected the charitable trust doctrine’s
application to conservation easements,168 claiming that the
requisite intent to create a trust is absent and that the law’s
limitations frustrate proper administration and alteration of
conservation easements. Moreover, these commentators169
believe that the Internal Revenue Code and accompanying
regulations adequately ensure that any modifications or
terminations will serve the public interest, since the nonprofit
could otherwise lose its tax-exempt status and the original
deduction could be invalidated.
Finally, in the context of governmental conservation
easements, there is a risk that charitable trust doctrine might
be used by some aggrieved members of the public to achieve a
result that they could not win through the democratic process or
usual legal channels. A right to invoke the charitable trust
doctrine should not exist to enable judges to second-guess elected
officials’ decisions regarding the acquisition, modification, and
termination of conservation easements. Indeed, objectors are not
166

The “conservation easements as charitable trusts” issue has been the
subject of significant discussion. See, e.g., Jessica E. Jay, Third-Party Enforcement of
Conservation Easements, 29 VT. L. REV. 757 (2005); C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v.
Dowd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8 WYO. L. REV. 25 (2008) [hereinafter Lindstrom, End of
Perpetuity] (same); C. Timothy Lindstrom, Conservation Easements, Common Sense
and the Charitable Trust Doctrine, 9 WYO. L. REV. 397 (2009) [hereinafter Lindstrom,
Conservation Easements] (rejecting the use of cy pres); Nancy A. McLaughlin & W.
William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation Easements: A Response to The End of
Perpetuity, 9 WYO. L. REV. 1 (2009) (supporting use of charitable trust law); Matthew J.
Richardson, Note, Conservation Easements as Charitable Trusts in Kansas: Striking
the Appropriate Balance Among the Grantor’s Intent, the Public’s Interest, and the Need
for Flexibility, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 175 (2009). For an excellent, thoughtful analysis of
this issue, see Jessica E. Jay, When Perpetual Is Not Forever: The Challenge of
Changing Conditions, Amendment, and Termination of Perpetual Conservation
Easements, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2012).
167
See McLaughlin & Weeks, supra note 166, at 5 (addressing perpetual
easements); id. at 27-28, 55-56, 80-82 (discussing charitable deductions); id. at 70-71
(discussing the public’s interest).
168
See Lindstrom, End of Perpetuity, supra note 166, at 83.
169
See, e.g., id. at 45-56.
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without protection. They can remove officials through the
democratic, electoral process. And they can invoke procedural
protections, as well. For example, general constitutional and
procedural requirements constrain officials’ actions and require
transparency. Moreover, specific statutes may set additional
procedural and public-participation requirements for these
decisions—for example, statutes governing the sale of
government-held land. If the objectors cannot prevail by these
means, they should not be allowed to hijack the process.
Democratic governments need freedom to perform the business
of the people.
a. Policy Considerations
Interpreting a conservation easement to create a
charitable trust generates several potential negative outcomes.
First, a charitable trust finding would mean that the restrictive
doctrine of cy pres applies to conservation easements. Under
that doctrine, a trust can be modified only if unforeseen
circumstances make the performance of the trust’s terms
impossible or impracticable.170 Unfortunately, the requirements
of unforeseen circumstances, impossibility, and impracticability
severely limit the circumstances where a conservation easement
could be modified to serve the public interest. Moreover, under
the cy pres doctrine, only courts are empowered to approve a
modification and make the final determination of what
constitutes an appropriate alteration to the trust. As a result,
the parties cannot agree to changes by themselves without
ultimate court approval.171 Therefore, this doctrine’s application
would severely limit the scope and circumstances of
conservation easement modifications and terminations. As I
have argued above, this is not a good result.
Second, because attorneys general have standing to
enforce the terms of charitable trusts, they have authority to
contest a proposed modification in a cy pres action.172 This
might prove problematic at times because it may expose a
governmental entity to intragovernmental turf battles with the
attorney general. Indeed, the units could have different
conceptions of the public interest, as well as potentially
competing political agendas. Finally, other third parties, such
170
171
172

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (1959).
Id. § 399 cmts. d, e.
Id. § 391 cmt. a.
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as members of a small class of persons for whom the trust is
created to benefit, may also have standing to participate in cy
pres proceedings—at least pursuant to the law of some
states173—and could stand in the way of beneficial modifications
and terminations for many of the reasons set forth above.174
b. Theoretical Gaps
Doctrinal problems may also arise in attempting to
apply charitable trust law to conservation easements. As an
initial matter, conservation easements are creatures of
property law, not charitable trust law. The fundamental goal of
their enabling acts, such as the Uniform Conservation
Easement Act (UCEA), is to ensure that conservation
easements are treated like other easements. For example,
section 2(a) of the UCEA states that “a conservation easement
may be created . . . released, modified, terminated, or otherwise
altered or affected in the same manner as other easements.”175
This means that the doctrines of real property law—doctrines
that allow termination of conservation easements upon consent
of the parties176 or by judicial action under rules of easement
and covenant law177—should apply.
Not only should the rules of property law control, but
the underlying policies and history of American land law
should also inform conservation easement decisions. Property
law has developed a series of principles to simultaneously
guide the allocation of our limited land resources, balance
competing private and public land rights, and accommodate the
social, personal, economic, historical, and political importance
of land ownership in the United States experience. Land law
also takes account of the needs of both the present owners and
of future generations.178 As creatures of property law,
conservation easements invoke these policy considerations, and
real property law supplies the architecture to find appropriate
solutions. For example, the law of easements and covenants
provides doctrines that allow for modifications and
173

Id. § 391 & cmt. c.
See supra Part III.B.1.
175
UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 170 (1981) (emphasis
added). Others rely on comments, rather than the text of the statute, for support to
view conservation easements as charitable trusts. See infra note 190.
176
KORNGOLD, supra note 101, §§ 6.08 (easements), 11.03 (covenants).
177
See id. at chs. 6, 11.
178
See generally Korngold, supra note 107.
174
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terminations to address changed conditions, violations of public
policy, and hardship.179 These doctrines help to prevent the
frustration of current generations’ autonomy and aspirations,
as well as the inefficiency of seemingly perpetual land ties.
Moreover, conservation easement donations are not like
typical charitable gifts since the donor retains an ownership
right—namely, the fee in the land that is subject to the
easement. This, in effect, creates two “owners” of the
property—the fee owner, and the easement holder—and the
rights of both must be recognized and protected. Fortunately,
various property-law doctrines have been designed to confront
these challenges: to manage various “owners” and their
interests, resolve conflicts, and allow for necessary flexibility.180
Cy pres proponents appear to overlook another
important distinction: an owner can donate land or property
without placing any restrictions on the gift.181 Although the
NPO or governmental donee must use the donated property to
serve its overall mission, there is no restriction that would
require the donee to continue to hold the property or use it in a
certain way. Indeed, the donee could sell the property and use
the cash for mission purposes.182 Alternatively, an owner could
donate a fee interest in land subject to a restriction. In that
instance, the donee must follow the terms of the restriction
precisely, in a manner analogous to a charitable trust.183 If
those terms cannot be effectuated as new conditions emerge,
then a cy pres proceeding would be necessary to find an
alternate use. For example, if a donor gave a fee interest in
land provided that the property is used for a boarding school
for orphans, the restriction must be followed. If it becomes
impractical to follow the restriction because, for example, there
179

See KORNGOLD, supra note 101, §§ 10.02 (covenants violating public
policy), 11.07 (changed conditions), 11.08 (relative hardship).
180
The law of waste, for example, manages conflicts between current and
future interest holders. See A. JAMES CASNER ET AL., CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY
358-60 (5th ed. 2004).
181
A.L.I., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 400(b)
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) [hereinafter ALI, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS DRAFT NO. 2].
182
GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT’S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 324 (“In
the case of the absolute gift full ownership of the property given vests in the corporation,
subject to the duties imposed upon it by its charter or articles of incorporation and by the
terms of any agreements it makes by contract or in its acceptance of a qualified gift. The
Attorney General has the power, as a representative of the state and by quo warranto or
other proceedings, to compel the corporation to perform these duties, but he acts in a
different capacity than as enforcer of charitable trusts.”).
183
See Blumenthal v. White, 683 A.2d 410, 413-14 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996)
(finding gift of land to city on condition for use as a park creates charitable trust); ALI,
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS DRAFT NO. 2, supra note 181, § 400(b).
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is an insufficient number of orphaned children, then a court
could apply cy pres and order that the property be used for a
similar purpose—for example, a school for children with only
one living parent.
Note, however, that the gifts in these examples convey a
fee interest in the land, which the donor gives either
unconditionally or subject to a restriction. On the other hand,
with gifts of conservation easements, the gift is the
conservation easement itself. In other words, the property right
the donee acquires is the power to limit the use of land held by
another. But there are no restrictions on the gift of the
easement. For example, the easement does not state that the
donor grants a conservation easement to the NPO subject to a
restriction that the NPO offer free landscape painting classes.
A gift of an easement therefore resembles a general gift to the
organization, much like an unrestricted fee donation, which
may be retained or sold as long as it serves the mission.184
Indeed, courts invoke cy pres only where a gift is subject to a
restriction, regardless of whether it is a fee or an easement. Cy
pres is not appropriate, however, where a gift of a fee or an
easement is unconditional.
Finally, some conservation easements may be acquired
by purchase rather than by gift.185 Even if one were to argue
that gifts of conservation easements should be construed as
creating charitable trusts (a view that this article rejects),
much less support exists for applying the law of charitable
trusts—which by its own terms only covers gifts—to easements
that were acquired for consideration.186
Others disagree with this assessment, however, and
argue for the application of charitable trust law to conservation
easements.187 Their positions are often based on articulated
policy concerns, including the importance of preserving land,
184

Selling a fee or an easement for a suboptimal amount—for example, for
less than the benefit the organization would have by simply retaining the property—
would not serve the mission. NPO directors would be held accountable for breach of
fiduciary duty if they foolishly made a sale for too little money. See A.L.I., PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGS. § 315 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (defining duty of
nonprofit directors).
185
See supra note 31 (discussing governmental easements acquired for
consideration).
186
See Loomis v. City of Boston, 117 N.E.2d 539, 540-41 (Mass. 1954)
(consideration plus lack of restrictive language mean no charitable trust was created);
but see Cohen v. Lynn, 598 N.E.2d 682, 685 (Mass App. Ct. 1992) (allowing charitable
trust despite payment of consideration).
187
See McLaughlin, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 434-35.
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respect for the donor’s intent, and loss of the public’s tax
expenditure.188 Moreover, modification outside of a cy pres
proceeding may well place the 170(h) charitable deduction in
dispute under current regulations and interpretations.189
While I recognize that cy pres proponents raise some
important policy concerns that cannot be ignored in crafting an
appropriate legal solution, I respectfully disagree with their
ultimate resolution of the issues. I have argued that the
charitable trust model is not appropriate for analysis of all
conservation easements and related modification issues. In
order to address important land use policies and the needs of
future generations, more flexible property-law modification and
termination doctrines should apply unless there is clear and
specific evidence of an intent by the donor, beyond the act of
creating a conservation easement, to create a charitable trust
and invoke that body of doctrine. At the same time, I hope that
the various voices on the charitable trust question might join in
a policy-based discussion of the issues and ultimately a greater
understanding and accommodation of other perspectives.190 If
188

See supra note 166 & accompanying text; see also Nancy A. McLaughlin & Mark
Benjamin Machlis, Protecting the Public Interest and Investment in Conservation: A Response
to Professor Korngold’s Critique of Conservation Easements, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1561.
189
See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6) (an easement is not denied deduction if
subsequent unexpected changes in conditions make continued use of the property
“impossible or impractical” for conservation, as long as funds from extinguishment of
easement are invested in another conservation easement; the regulation does not
permit swaps that are merely advantageous to conservation goals, but has the high
threshold of “impossible or impractical” for conservation purposes); Belk v. Comm’r,
No. 5437-10, 2013 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS, at *23-28 (U.S. T.C. Jan. 28, 2013) (clause in
easement agreement allowing donor to unilaterally substitute new property for land
being placed under easement prevented deduction; arguably, the facts are
distinguishable from a situation where there is no such clause and the easement holder
and donor subsequently mutually agree to a swap that increases the conservation goals
of the nonprofit or governmental holder).
190
Textual support for treatment of conservation easements as charitable
trusts is ambiguous. Language inserted into the Prefatory Note of the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act in 2007 states that “the Act does not directly address the
application of charitable trust principles to conservation easements.” UNIF. CONSERV.
EASEMENT ACT, Prefatory Note, at 3 (2007). Somewhat surprisingly in light of that
comment, the Comment to section 3 of the Act was amended at the same time to read
that “the existing case and statute law of adopting states as it relates to the
enforcement of charitable trusts should apply to conservation easements.” Id. § 3 cmt.
This does not clearly state, though, that conservation easements are considered to be
charitable trusts. Indeed, the charitable trust law of a state might be applied to find a
lack of intent to create a charitable trust with respect to any particular easement. This
same Comment to section 3 quotes the comment to Uniform Trust Act § 414 in support,
yet that only states that conservation easements “will frequently create a charitable
trust”—but, by its own terms, not always. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting UNIF. TRUST
ACT § 414 cmt. (2000)). Finally, these are statements in the comments of uniform acts,
and courts typically hold that such comments are not controlling authority but may
provide some guidance on legislative intent. See, e.g., Wakefield v. Crawley, 6 S.W.3d
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so, a consensus may begin to develop on a viable, workable, and
realistic modification and termination model that will serve
present and future conservation goals and generations.
c. Illustrative Cases
Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc.
correctly refused to apply charitable trust law to a conservation
easement, thus denying standing to an open-space-preservation
association and two of its members and dismissing their
challenge to a governmental easement holder’s decision.191 The
Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation (MALPF),
an entity of the Maryland Department of Agriculture, purchased
an agricultural preservation easement over Bellevale’s 199-acre
farm for $796,500.192 The easement limited the land’s use to
agricultural purposes and lasted “in perpetuity, or for so long as
profitable farming is feasible” on the land.193 A Maryland statute,
however, permitted owners of land subject to such easements to
terminate the arrangement after twenty-five years, thus in
effect limiting the perpetual feature.194 Subsequently, MALPF
approved Bellevale’s request for permission to build a 7000- to
10,000-square-foot building to house a creamery operation,
processing facility, and farm store. In support of its decision,
MALPF reasoned that under the terms of the easement
agreement, this was a “farm related use.”195
The Long Green Valley Association (LGVA), a
community organization dedicated to open-space preservation
in the Green Valley, and the Yoders, neighbors of Bellevale and
members of LGVA, challenged the MALPF decision.196 After
MALPF and the state secretary of agriculture refused to
reverse the approval, plaintiffs brought suit.197 Plaintiffs sought
a declaration that the creamery operation would violate the
442, 446-47 (Tenn. 1999) (comments to U.C.C. helped to clarify legislative intent to
include stock in closely-held corporation within definition of “security”). The strongest
statement supporting cy pres comes in Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes
§ 7.11, cmt. a, an influential but nonbinding source. Moreover, the hunt for textual
clues and fragments suggesting the charitable trust view obscures the essential policy
inquiry that should be taking place.
191
Long Green Valley Ass’n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc., No. 0228, 2012 WL 468245
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. Feb. 14, 2012), vacated, 46 A.3d 473 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012).
192
46 A.3d at 478.
193
Id. at 479.
194
Id. at 497-98.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 479-80.
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conservation easement and requested a writ of mandamus to
order enforcement of the easement agreement.198 Plaintiffs
argued that the conservation easement created a charitable
trust that “any interested person,” including LGVA and the
Yoders, could enforce.199
The court extensively examined the conservationeasement–charitable-trust issue. It discussed secondary sources
and the limited case law before concluding that there was
insufficient intent to create a charitable trust in the
conservation easement before it. The court, however, limited its
holding to the facts, stating that “we are not persuaded that the
charitable trust doctrine must be applied to purchased,
nonperpetual agricultural preservation easements, nor even that
it should be.”200 Given the limited duration and consideration, the
court found that the “donor” (that is, Bellevale) did not intend to
create one.201 The court noted that while there are no specific
words required for creation of a trust in the conservationeasement context, it “is not something to be lightly inferred.”202
Thus, parties are free to create a charitable trust relationship
with respect to a conservation easement, but they must do so
clearly. This view implicitly recognizes that if easements are
treated as charitable trusts, they generate concerns of
increased standing, loss of flexibility, and diminished control by
democratically elected representatives.203
C.

Statutory Controls on Conservation Easement Flexibility

A diverse range of state legislation governs the
termination and modification of governmentally held
conservation easements.204 In particular, however, there are
three varieties of statutes that might contain restrictions on
easement alteration: legislation authorizing conservation
198
199
200
201
202

Id. at 480.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 494.
Id. at 501.
Id. at 494-96 (quoting Lindstrom, Conservation Easements, supra note 166,

at 403).
203

See generally Hicks ex rel. Bd. of Trs. of the Scenic Preserve Trust v. Dowd,
157 P.3d 914 (Wyo. 2007). This decision is of ambiguous precedential value in finding that
conservation easements create charitable trusts because of its specific facts and because
neither side challenged the trial court’s determination that a charitable trust was created.
204
For a comprehensive and helpful compilation, see Nancy A. McLaughlin,
Internal Revenue Code Section 170(h): National Perpetuity Standards for Federally
Subsidized Conservation Easements, Part 2: Comparison to State Law, 46 REAL PROP.
TR. & EST. J. 1, app. A (2011).
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easements in general, statutes creating specific governmental
easement programs, and legislation governing the sale of
governmental assets and land in general. In order to achieve
policy goals, these statutes should be crafted and interpreted to
capture the flexibility and governance benefits of governmental
conservation easements.
1. General Conservation Easement Statutes
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act and a number
of state statutes provide that conservation easements may be
released, terminated, or modified in the same manner as other
easements.205 These statutes apply both to governmental and
NPO easements, but they usually fail to provide specific
substantive or procedural guidelines for the alteration of
easements. Nevertheless, some statutes that generally authorize
conservation easements do mandate special procedures to
terminate governmental or NPO easements, such as approval by
a governmental executive or legislative body.206 For example,
New York requires that termination be permitted under the
terms of the instrument or secured through the exercise of
eminent domain, and it also prescribes a judicial proceeding to
terminate easements held by NPOs or public bodies.207
2. Specific Governmental Easement Programs
In addition to statutes generally authorizing
conservation easements, many states have enabling legislation
creating particular programs for governmental conservation
easements.208 Some of this legislation delineates specific
requirements with respect to the release, termination, and
modification of easements under these programs.209 Most of the
statutes only address requirements for termination or release,210
205

See id. at 71 (citing Florida, Illinois, and Idaho, as well as the Uniform Act
jurisdictions).
206
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-34 (West 2012); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 76-111 (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8B-5 (West 2012) (also requiring
prior public hearing).
207
See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 49-0301 (McKinney 2012).
208
McLaughlin, supra note 204, app. B at 90-92 (providing an excellent
description of such statutes). This section relies on Professor McLaughlin’s compilation.
209
Id. at 90-124 (describing legislation relating to such programs).
210
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 10270-10277 (West 2003) (agricultural
easements); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(c) (West 2011) (agricultural easement);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 917 (agricultural easements); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432:24
(2012) (water supply protection).
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while a limited number cover modifications and alterations, as
well.211 Many of the statutes with termination requirements
involve agricultural easements.212
These legislative acts may dictate procedural
requirements, including a public hearing prior to termination;213
approval by the executive or legislative branch,214 perhaps with
a required onsite inspection of the property215 or judicial
authorization;216 a judicial proceeding to review the executive or
legislative termination decision;217 and voter approval.218
Substantive requirements may include a finding of a public
interest or necessity for termination;219 a finding of an absence
of plausible alternatives;220 a determination that the required
agricultural use is no longer profitable;221 a payment to the
government holder equal to the value of the released rights;222 a

211

See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-314 (2005) (easements held by Natural
Heritage Commission); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 103F.515, .535 (2012) (agricultural easements).
212
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 10260-10277 (agricultural easements);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(c) (agricultural easement); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3,
§§ 901-941 (1998) (agricultural easements); 3 PA. CONS. STAT. § 903 (2012)
(agricultural easements).
213
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(c) (agricultural easement); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 486-A:13 (water supply protection easement); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 13:8-49, -56 (West 1977) (scenic river easements).
214
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 10200-10277 (agricultural easements);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 324.36101 to .36117 (2008) (farmland and open space); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 103F.515 (agricultural easements); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432:31-a (water
supply protection); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 32-4-4, -6 (2012) (easements pursuant to Green
Acres Land Acquisition Act); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-59-10 to -140 (2002) (easements
owned by South Carolina Land Bank).
215
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 917 (agricultural easements).
216
See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 262.908(2)(c) (West 1994) (agricultural
easements).
217
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-314 (easements held by Natural Heritage
Commission).
218
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(c) (agricultural easement); 32
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5010 (West 2012) (open space easements).
219
See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 10273 (agricultural easements); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(c) (agricultural easement); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 103F.535
(agricultural easements); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 432:26 (agricultural easements);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 11-15-108 (West 1976) (open space easements).
220
See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-20-314 (easements held by Natural Heritage
Commission).
221
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 917 (2012) (agricultural easements); see
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 106-735 to -745 (2011) (agricultural easements); 3 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN § 903 (West 2012) (agricultural easements).
222
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-26cc(i) (agricultural easement);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.36106 (West 2002) (farmland and open space); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 486-A:13(II)(e), (III)(b) (water supply protection easement and scenic
river easements); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-59-10 to -140 (2002) (easements owned by
South Carolina Land Bank).
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return to the state of any grant funds used to acquire the
easement;223 and a replacement easement.224
A number of states set a low bar for termination or
modification. For example, Illinois permits the release of some
governmental easements simply upon mutual consent of the
parties.225 Additionally, West Virginia permits the fee owner to
essentially cancel an agricultural easement at will by repaying
the amount initially received for the easement.226
3. Disposition of Governmental Lands Generally
Government termination or modification of a
conservation easement could be viewed as a reconveyance of
the easement rights in whole (termination) or in part
(modification) to the fee owner. This raises the question of
whether such “reconveyance” is consistent with the general rules
regulating government transfers of real property. Those rules
vary, however, depending on whether the land is held for public
use or “private” use—that is, a ministerial or governmental
capacity rather than for the public’s use more broadly.227
Property held by the government for “private” purposes
can be sold,228 subject to various procedural rules.229 These rules
may require, for example, public notice of sales and a bidding
process,230 as well as approval by specified government officers

223

See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 173A-10 (LexisNexis 2012); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 486-A:15 (2012) (water supply protection easement); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 324-12 (2012) (easements pursuant to Green Acres Land Acquisition Act).
224
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-59-80 (2012) (easements owned by South
Carolina Land Bank).
225
See, e.g., 505 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 35/1-1 to 4-1 (West 2012) (conservation
easements generally); id. 35/2-1 to 2-5 (easements pursuant to the topsoil protection
program); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 901.21 to .22 (West 2012) (agricultural easements
extinguished according to terms of the creating instrument).
226
W.VA. CODE §§ 8A-12-1 to -21 (2004) (agricultural easements).
227
10 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 28:35 (3d ed. 2012). The
public/private distinction is sometimes difficult to make. Id. § 28:41.
228
Id. § 28:35.
229
See, e.g., IND. CODE § 36-1-11-4 (2011) (describing sales procedures); State
ex rel. King v. Lyons, 248 P.3d 878, 881 (N.M. 2011) (New Mexico Constitution requires
that the state land cannot be sold or leased except to the highest and best bidder at a
public auction.); Killam Ranch Props., Ltd. v. Webb Cnty., No. 04-10-00324-CV, 2012
WL 1193722 at *2-4 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 11, 2012) (discussing TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE
ANN. §§ 263.007, 272.002 (West 2007) (requirements for sale of land by counties,
including public notice and sealed bids)). Political subdivisions are subject to state
control as they are agents of the state. See 10 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,
supra note 227, §§ 28:35, :40.
230
See supra note 229.
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and bodies.231 Other guidelines may examine the terms of the
sale, requiring, for example, “adequate consideration.”232 A
central purpose motivating these restrictions is to ensure that
governments receive the highest price possible whenever they
sell a public asset, thus providing maximum assistance to the
public purse.233 Furthermore, these rules may help to prevent
corruption in sales and protect government officials from
pressure and coercion.234
Property held by the government for public use cannot
be sold except pursuant to specific statutory authority.235 These
statutes typically impose requirements beyond mere procedural
fairness, however. Parks, for example, are often singled out for
special attention.236 Thus, in California, land that has been
dedicated to park use cannot be conveyed by a park district
unless approved at a special meeting by a majority of the
district’s voters.237 In New York, park land cannot be sold
without approval of the state legislature,238 given that
“dedicated park areas in New York are impressed with a public
trust for the benefit of the people of the State.”239 A prerequisite
to such treatment, however, is that the land must be dedicated
to public use, which may require certain formalities.240
Together, these protections demonstrate the public’s special
231

See, e.g., IND. CODE § 36-1-11-3 (approval by executive and also by fiscal
body for property appraised at over $50,000).
232
N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; see W.N.Y. Land Conservancy v. Town of
Amherst, 773 N.Y.S.2d 768, 770 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
233
See, e.g., King, 248 P.3d at 882-83; In re LaBarbera v. Town of Woodstock,
814 N.Y.S.2d 376, 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (N.Y. CONST., art. VIII, § 1 bars
conveyance of public property to private entities without adequate consideration.).
234
See, e.g., King, 248 P.3d at 883, 889; see also Murphy v. State, 181 P.2d
336, 338 (Ariz. 1974) (describing land sale abuses when states admitted to Union
disposed of large amount of public land).
235
10 MCQUILLIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, supra note 227, §§ 28:35, :36.
236
But see Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. Citizens for Educ. & Env’t, Inc., 552
S.E.2d 483, 483 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding city charter provision giving
municipality the right to sell or otherwise dispose of park properties).
237
CAL PUB. RES. CODE § 5540 (West 1985) (including conservation easements
dedicated to open space). Land held by park districts but not dedicated as such,
however, are not subject to this provision. Ste. Marie v. Riverside Cnty. Reg’l Park &
Open-Space Dist., 206 P.3d 739 (Cal. 2009); see also Citizens Planning Ass’n v. City of
Santa Barbara, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 495 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (city ordinance restricting
sale of parkland unless majority of voters approve).
238
Levine v. Vill. of Island Park Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 944 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272
(N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
239
Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1055
(N.Y. 2001).
240
Courts thus must determine if the land was actually dedicated or acquired
otherwise by the city. See, e.g., Vestavia Hills Bd. of Educ. v. Utz, 530 So. 2d 1378,
1380-81 (Ala. 1988); Ste. Marie, 206 P.3d at 741.
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interest in parks, the assumption that parks should remain as
such, and perhaps the legislature’s concern that government
officials may be willing to compromise those values for
expediency or more sinister reasons.
The courts have protected parklands with equal vigor.
For example, one court rejected a simple utilitarian test,
explaining that “no objects, however worthy, . . . which have no
connection with park purposes, should be permitted to
encroach upon [parkland] without legislative authority plainly
conferred.”241 Other jurisdictions, however, may not be quite so
deferential to parkland—at least under some circumstances.
For example, courts have drawn a distinction between land
donated to a city in fee simple absolute, on one hand, and land
donated conditionally or formally dedicated to park purposes,
on the other, permitting cities to sell the former but not the
latter.242 Presumably, these jurisdictions are willing to let
elected officials settle the issue of park permanence, allowing
the political process and procedural rules to protect citizens.
Courts thus must distinguish absolute gifts containing only
precatory words from gifts manifesting a grantor’s intent to
impress a binding park restriction.243
As a preliminary matter, a court must determine
whether governmental conservation easements are held for
“public use.” When the easement does not grant public access,
one could argue that there is no actual use of the land by the
public and that the land is therefore different from parkland.
On the other hand, the public does derive a benefit from the
scenic values, habitat protection, and open-space benefits the
easement secures. Indeed, the law recognizes nonpossessory
interests, such as restrictive covenants, as valued property
rights. Accordingly, a court would likely find that governmental
conservation easements are for public use.

241

Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920).
See, e.g., O’Rorke v. City of Homewood, 237 So. 2d 487, 489 (Ala. 1970); Carlson
v. City of Fremont, 142 N.W.2d 157, 159 (Neb. 1966); see Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v.
Citizens for Educ. & Env’t, Inc., 552 S.E.2d 483 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding city charter
provision giving municipality the right to sell or otherwise dispose of park properties).
243
Compare Loomis v. City of Boston, 117 N.E.2d 539, 541 (Mass. 1954) (park
land could be sold), with Cohen v. City of Lynn, 598 N.E.2d 682, 684-85 (Mass. Ct. App.
1992) (binding words of condition).
242
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CONCLUSION
Governmental conservation easements are a valuable
tool, along with easements held by nonprofit organizations and
public land use regulation, to help protect our limited land
resources. In certain situations, governmental conservation
easements offer unique benefits by increasing efficiency, avoiding
coercive governmental action, promoting flexibility of
conservation arrangements, and valuing democratic participation
in vital land use decisions. Accordingly, legislatures and courts
should ensure that the law regulating governmental easements
is designed and applied in ways that maximize their benefits for
today’s citizens and future generations.

